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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff-Respondent,: Case No. 21027 
v* : 
RONNIE LEE GARDNER, : Priority No. 1 
Defendant-Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
1. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in denying 
defendant's motion for a change of venue? 
2. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in denying 
defendant's motion for recusal of Judge Banks? 
3. Is Utah's capital sentencing procedure 
unconstitutional as applied to defendant? 
4. Is Utah's death penalty statute unconstitutional on 
its face? 
5. Is Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-207 (1983) 
unconstitutionally overbroad and vague? 
6. Is Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-202(1)(h) unconstitutional 
in that it allows the presentation of prejudicial information to 
the jury? 
7. Did the trial court err in not granting a challenge 
ot a juror for cause? 
8. Was there an excessive number of security officers 
present in the courtroom during defendant's trial such that 
defendant was prejudiced? 
9. Did the t r i a l court l i m i t cross-examination of 
Richard Thomas such that defendant was prejudiced? 
10 . Was i t manifest error for the t r i a l court to admit 
defendant's prior incons i s t en t statements for impeachment 
purposes even i f they were obtained in v i o l a t i o n of the F i f th and 
Sixth amendments? 
1 1 . Did the jury ins truc t ion on manslaughter correc t ly 
def ine manslaughter under a theory of extreme emotional 
disturbance? 
12 . May the jury be instructed that i t must f i r s t 
acquit defendant of the charged offense before considering any 
l e s s e r included offenses? 
13 . Was the evidence s u f f i c i e n t to support the jury ' s 
verd ic t and did the t r i a l court properly deny defendant's request 
for a d irected verdic t of second degree murder or manslaughter? 
14 . Was there prosecutor ia l misconduct? 
15 . Could the jury properly consider at penalty phase 
a prior homicide committed by defendant for which he was not 
convicted u n t i l af ter the homicide in t h i s case occurred? 
16. Should the t r i a l court have exercised d i s c r e t i o n 
to admit evidence comparing defendant's crime to the crimes of 
others and evidence that a c l o s e a s soc ia te of the v ic t im thought 
the v i c t im would not have wanted defendant to be sentenced to 
death? 
17. I s t h i s Court required to do a case -by-case 
comparison to determine i f defendant's death sentence i s 
proportionate to h is crime before i t can affirm the sentence? 
- 2 -
18. Was there cumulative error warranting reversal of 
this case? 
gTATgMSflT OF rm CASE 
Defendant, Ronnie Lee Gardner, was charged by 
information with one count of first degree murder, a capital 
felony, under Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-202 (1978 & Supp. 1983) 
(amended 1984, 1985); one count of attempted murder, a first 
degree felony, under Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-202 (1978 & Supp. 
1983) (amended 1984, 1985); one count of aggravated kidnapping, a 
first degree felony, under Utah Code Ann, § 76-5-302 (197 8 & 
Supp. 1987); one count of escape, a second degree felony, under 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-309 (1978); one count of possession of a 
dangerous weapon by an incarcerated person, a second degree 
felony, under Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-503 (1978 & Supp. 1983) 
(amended 1986). (R. 40-45) . After a jury trial, defendant was 
found guilty as charged (R. 597-609) . Once a penalty hearing had 
been completed, the jury returned a verdict of death on the first 
degree murder conviction (R» 597). The trial court sentenced 
defendant to statutorily authorized sentences for the attempted 
first degree murder, the aggravated kidnapping, the escape, and 
the possession of a dangerous weapon by an incarcerated person 
(R. 743-746) . 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On April 2, 19 85, two transportation officers from the 
Utah State Prison, Luther Hensley and Stan McAfee, accompanied 
detendant from lawful custody at the prison to the Third District 
Court (R. 1981-83, 2046, 2394). They arrived at the basement 
-3-
en t rance a t about 8:55 a .m. , parked t h e ca r behind a blue van and 
en te red the bu i ld ing through the nearby g l a s s double doors (R. 
1984, 1985, 1996, 2056) . As t he t r i o approached the e l e v a t o r s 
i n s i d e the foyer de fendan t , who was d ressed in whi te p r i s o n 
c l o t h i n g and shackled wi th leg i r o n s and a w a i s t cha in a t tached 
to handcuf f s , turned and walked c a s u a l l y toward the d r ink ing 
foun ta in behind them (R. 1983, 1998, 2048, 2058) . From a woman 
who stood near the f o u n t a i n , defendant obta ined a handgun which 
he poin ted a t the guards as he turned on them and began t o move 
toward them (R. 2001, 2002, 2059-60, 2106-2110) . Hensley, who 
had followed defendant and t r i e d t o grab him when he no t iced the 
woman, y e l l e d to McAfee to ge t back and began backing toward the 
doors himself as he reached for h i s r evo lve r (R. 2001 , 2002, 
2059) . 
Defendant appeared t o be fumbling wi th the gun as i f i t 
was handed t o him awkwardly (R. 2060) • He cont inued t o advance 
slowly on the guards who drew t h e i r weapons as they r e t r e a t e d 
more qu ick ly o u t s i d e a l l the whi le t e l l i n g defendant to pu t down 
h i s weapon (R. 2002-03 , 2061) . As Hensley went through the door , 
he f i r e d a t defendant through the open doors (R. 2004-05, 2063) . 
Hens l ey ' s s h o t wounded defendant in t h e shoulder (R. 2006, 2064) . 
Defendant ducked i n t o the door of a nearby o f f i c e a f t e r 
he was s h o t (R. 2006, 2064, 2150-52) . I n s i d e t h e o f f i c e , were 
t h r e e a t t o r n e y s , a c o u r t c l e r k and a uniformed p r i s o n employee 
(R. 214 4-47) . Defendant f i r s t backed i n t o the door and glanced 
i n s i d e then walked to the e l e v a t o r s o u t s i d e and t r i e d to push the 
bu t t on (R. 2152-53) . When he could no t reach the b u t t o n t o c a l l 
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the e l e v a t o r , defendant returned to the c l e r k ' s o f f i c e where the 
attorneys had dived behind the doors which were propped open; one 
to the north and two to the south (R. 2153-54) • Behind the south 
doors were Robert Macri and Michael Burdell (R. 2154, 2212-13) . 
Defendant looked at the two, said "Oh, fu • . . ," aimed at them, 
paused a second or two, then f ired (R. 2155-57) . The shot struck 
Burdell in the head from about one foot away (R. 2157, 2202, 
2215, 2349, 2352) . At the same time, Macri turned, ran out the 
door and out of the bu i ld ing , shouting for help (R. 2158, 2217) . 
The guards who were outs ide using the radio to c a l l for help and 
watching the e x i t s saw Macri run out (R. 2007, 2162, 2165^66). 
During the time after defendant obtained the gun, Cathy 
Grotepas, a court reporter , who had been waiting for the e levator 
with defendant and the guards, managed to get into the e levator 
and ride to the 5th f loor (R. 2104, 2112, 2116) . Before she got 
into the e l e v a t o r , Ms. Grotepas heard two shots but she did not 
know defendant was wounded and never heard defendant say anything 
(R. 2110-11) . As the doors to the e levator c l o s e d , she l a s t saw 
defendant standing crouched ready to f i r e (R. 2112) . Once on the 
f i f t h f l o o r , Grotepas told a b a i l i f f , Nick Kirk, she thought a 
guard was shot (R. 2116-17, 2271, 2273) . 
Kirk, uniformed but unarmed, ran down the stairway to 
the basement to warn off his judge and saw defendant standing 
ins ide the c l e r k ' s o f f i c e (R. 2275) . Kirk looked around for h i s 
judge and turned back toward defendant, coming face to face with 
him (R. 2175-77) . Defendant raised the gun he he ld , aimed at 
Kirk and shot him in the stomach (R. 2277) . Kirk slumped to the 
f loor (R. 2278) . 
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Back ins ide the c l e r k ' s o f f i c e , defendant told Richard 
Thomas, the unarmed prison employee to "come on, you asshole" and 
show him the way out (R. 2251, 2278-79) . Thomas stepped over 
Burdell and Kirk and led defendant back out the o f f i c e doors 
defendant came in through, t e l l i n g defendant there was no other 
e x i t , to the s t a i r w e l l (R. 2163, 2252, 2254) . Defendant shuffled 
up the s t a i r s (R. 2255) . The guards saw Kirk f a l l and watched 
defendant go to the s t a i r s with Thomas (R. 2006, 2009, 2067) . 
More o f f i c e r s arr ived, Thomas came outside and they a l l began to 
search for defendant (R. 2112, 2168-70) . 
From the testimony at t r i a l , i t appears that defendant 
went in and out the door to the c l e r k ' s o f f i c e two or three times 
during the e n t i r e episode (R. 2150, 2153, 2162-63) . Thomas told 
defendant twice that there was no other e x i t (R. 2162-63, 2250, 
2259) . Macri described defendant as confused, blank and h e l p l e s s 
(R. 2240) . Thomas described defendant on April 5 as g lassy-eyed 
and incoherent but said at t r i a l that defendant seemed to be "a l l 
there" and when Thomas told him to leave he immediately turned 
around and l e f t . (R. 2261) . 
Once defendant was on the s t a i r s , he went to the second 
f loor where he accosted a vending machine serviceman, Wilburn 
Mil ler (R. 2289, 2295) . Defendant told Mil ler to help him saying 
"You are next . Walk with me." and waving the gun (R. 2297, 
2308) . They went out the doors on the eas t s ide of the building 
but once o u t s i d e , Mil ler broke away, ran back into the building 
and dived through the cashier window at the Family Support Office 
(R 2297-2299) . Defendant proceeded to the front lawn of the 
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courthouse where he was apprehended by other o f f i c e r s (R. 2313-
15) . 
Defendant was bleeding from his shoulder and said he 
could not breathe but had a blank f a c i a l e x p r e s s i o n seemed calm 
and gave no ind icat ion of pain (R. 2315-17, 2332) . He smiled a 
couple of times (R. 2071, 2333) . 
Michael Burdell was pronounced dead on arrival at the 
hosp i ta l (R. 2351) . Nick Kirk was in the hospi ta l a l i t t l e over 
one week for treatment of his i n ] u r i e s (R. 2280) . 
The gun that was passed to defendant was a s i n g l e -
act ion .22 c a l i b e r revolver (R. 2363, 2368-69) . Each time the 
gun i s f i r e d , i t s hammer must be cocked in a separate action (R. 
2363) . The gun w i l l not f i r e without f i r s t being cocked (R. 
2363, 2365-66) . 
The woman who passed the gun to defendant was 
i d e n t i f i e d as Carma Hainsworth (R. 2059-60, 2171-72) . Ms. 
Hainsworth entered the foyer sometime before defendant arrived 
from the prison (R. 2135-3 6 ) . She carried a duf fe l bag and went 
toward the restroom, then s a t in a chair on the foyer's , west wal l 
(R. 2135-36, 2145) . A tan duf fe l bag was found in the women's 
restroom under the sink (R. 2377-78) . I t contained various items 
of c l o t h i n g , a hunting k n i f e , a r o l l of duct tape and a ski mask 
(R. 2379-80) . 
Defendant admitted at t r i a l that he had made a plan 
with a friend to escape which c l o s e l y matched t h i s escape attempt 
(R. 2305-08) . The friend was to hang a gun from a hook on the 
drinking fountain handle in the courthouse foyer (R. 2305) . 
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Clothes were to be l e t t in the bathroom in the bag that was used 
in t h i s incident (R. 2308# 2444) . Defendant planned to change 
h i s c l o t h e s in the women's restroom and use duct tape to res tra in 
the guards (R. 2421) . He claimed, however, that he was surprised 
by the woman with the gun and that he was unfamiliar with the gun 
(R. 2411, 2413) . He complained that he was a nervous wreck and 
became dazed when he was wounded and did not r e c a l l most of what 
happened (R. 2415-16, 2422, 2454) although he did r e c a l l shooting 
Kirk, talking to Thomas and Mil ler and walking up the s t a i r s (R. 
2416-19, 2422) . He a lso admitted that he walked toward the 
drinking fountain to further his plan to escape and that he 
thought the woman, whom he would not i d e n t i f y , was there to 
sh ie ld a weapon (R. 2441-42) . Carma Hainsworth v i s i t e d defendant 
at prison two days before the escape attempt (R. 2442) . 
On r e b u t t a l , Wayne Jorgensen, a s t a t e prison employee, 
t e s t i f i e d that he was assigned to guard defendant at the 
Universi ty Hospital on April 25 , 1985 (R. 2482) . He stated that 
defendant was t a l k a t i v e and in good s p i r i t s that day (R. 2483) . 
He asked defendant whether he would have shot Luther Hensley and 
defendant repl ied that he would have but the gun would not f i r e 
even though he kept pul l ing the tr igger (R. 2484) . Defendant 
said that he intended to shoot Hensley. 
Defendant said that he shot Michael Burdel l because he 
saw two persons when he went around the corner and he thought one 
of them looked as though he would jump defendant (R. 2486) . 
Defendant knew he h i t Burdell because he saw him f a l l (R. 2486) . 
He a l s o s tated that he would have k i l l e d anyone who tr ied to stop 
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him or ge t in h i s way and that he hated prison (R. 2487-88) . 
Defendant did not know he was shot u n t i l people were screaming at 
him to drop the gun, and then he saw the blood (R. 2487) . 
The jury found defendant g u i l t y of f i r s t - d e g r e e murder, 
attempted f i r s t - d e g r e e murder, aggravated kidnapping, escape and 
possess ion of a dangerous weapon by an inmate. A penalty phase 
was held on the i ssue of the death penalty and the jury 
determined that death was an appropriate penalty in t h i s c a s e . 
Defendant did not chal lenge the suf f i c i ency of the aggravating 
fac tors to outweigh the mit igat ing fac tors and, therefore , the 
evidence presented in the penalty hearing i s not re lated here. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Due to the number of i s sues involved in t h i s appeal and 
the space r e s t r a i n t s , t h i s summary i s n e c e s s a r i l y b r i e f . 
Defendant did not demonstrate prejudice as a r e s u l t of 
media coverage and was not e n t i t l e d to a change of venue. 
Moreover, he was tr ied by a f a i r and impartial jury whose members 
held no bias towards defendant or the death penal ty . 
Because defendant did not a l l ege or prove any. b ias or 
prejudice on behalf of Judge Banks, no error occurred in the 
denial of defendant's motion for recusa l . 
Utah's cap i ta l sentencing procedures are c o n s t i t u t i o n a l 
on the ir face and as applied to defendant. Those procedures have 
c o n s i s t e n t l y withstood c o n s t i t u t i o n a l cha l lenges in t h i s Court 
and most recent ly in federal d i s t r i c t court . 
This Court resolved the issue of whether Utah's death 
penalty s t a t u t e i s unconst i tut ional on i t s face against defendant 
in st?te Vt Pierre. 
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The aggravating circumstance charged under Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-5-202(1)(h) i s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l . Evidence of defendant's 
prior conv ic t ion for robbery was not admitted to show criminal 
d i s p o s i t i o n on the part of defendant, but instead was admitted as 
an element of the crime of f i r s t degree murder. The evidence was 
not pre jud ic ia l s ince the jury f i r s t had to determine that 
defendant i n t e n t i o n a l l y or knowingly caused the death of the 
v ic t im before the jury could consider any aggravating 
circumstances. Even assuming 76-5-202(1)(h) i s uncons t i tu t iona l , 
no error occurred s ince the jury found that two other aggravating 
circumstances were present in defendant's c a s e . 
Because defendant withdrew h is chal lenge of juror 
Copinga, the t r i a l court did not have the opportunity to rule on 
the defendant's cha l l enge . Assuming defendant had preserved h i s 
cha l l enge , no error occurred s ince Mr. Copinga t e s t i f i e d that he 
could follow the c o u r t ' s ins truc t ions and examine a l l of the 
evidence before imposing the death penal ty . 
Defendant was not prejudiced by secur i ty guards in the 
courtroom. The number of guards was minimal, four, and the 
guards were in c i v i l i a n c l o t h e s and unarmed. 
The matter and extent of cross-examination i s within 
the d i s c r e t i o n of the t r i a l judge and h i s ruling should not be 
disturbed unless i t i s p r e j u d i c i a l . Because defendant had ample 
opportunity to examine Mr. Thomas, no error occurred and 
defendant was not prejudiced. 
Even i f defendant's prior i n c o n s i s t e n t statements were 
e l i c i t e d in v i o l a t i o n of the F i f th and Sixth amendments, they 
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were properly admitted for impeachment af ter defendant denied 
making them. Thus, i t was not manifest error to admit the 
statements absent an object ion by defendant. 
The jury ins truct ion offered by defendant on 
manslaughter did not correc t ly s t a t e the law and the ins truct ion 
given by the court did correc t ly s t a t e the law in reference to 
extreme emotional d i s turbances . The jury must view the 
circumstances of the crime from an objec t ive viewpoint under Utah 
law and a defendant may not mi t igate murder to manslaughter using 
h i s own criminal acts as the bas i s for h i s emotional disturbance. 
This Court has previously held that i t i s proper to 
ins truc t the jury that i t must acquit defendant of the charged 
offense before moving on to consider any l e s s e r included o f f ense . 
The instances of al leged prosecutor ia l misconduct were 
not misconduct at a l l . The prosecutor did not c a l l to the jury ' s 
a t tent ion matters that they would not otherwise be j u s t i f i e d in 
cons ider ing . Nor was defendant prejudiced by any of the al leged 
instances of misconduct. 
Because i t i s proper to use even unadjudicated criminal 
of fenses as evidence of aggravation in the penalty phase, the 
t r i a l court properly admitted the evidence of a previous homicide 
committed by defendant even though he pled g u i l t y to second 
degree murder after the homicide in t h i s c a s e . Sect ion 76-3-207 
(2) does not preclude introduction of t h i s evidence s ince i t 
a l lows introduct ion of evidence of defendant's character and any 
other f a c t s in aggravation. 
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It was not an abuse of discretion for the trial court 
to exclude defendant's proffered evidence which asked the jury to 
engage in comparative analysis of his case with others• The 
evidence was not relevant to the nature of defendant's crime. 
The court also properly excluded testimony of a close associate 
of the victim that she thought the victim would not have wanted 
defendant to receive the death penalty* Based upon defendant's 
proffer, defendant apparently wanted to present the witnesses' 
and the victim's religious views against the death penalty. Such 
evidence has previously been found excludable by this Court. 
This Court is not required to perform a case-by-case 
proportionality comparison before affirming defendant's death 
sentence. This Court must only determine whether the decision to 
impose the death penalty was made in the context of the 
circumstances of defendant and his crime. In that context/ the 
death penalty was proportionate to defendant and his crime. 
None of the errors alleged by defendant either 
cumulative or standing alone warrant reversal of this case. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
TBE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION 
IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR A CHANGE OF 
VENUE 
On J u l y 23
 # 1985, defendant filed a motion for a change 
of venue out of Salt Lake County (R. 146-52) . A hearing on that 
motion was held on August 5# 1985 (R. 1156-7 8) . After hearing 
argument, the court denied defendant's motion (R. 376/ 417). The 
trial court found that the media coverage of the incident was not 
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overly extensive; t h a t the media and newspaper coverage was a 
statewide dissemination of information; and tha t the survey 
presented by defendant did not persuade the cour t tha t a jury 
could not be impaneled in the case (R. 417)• 
Defendant a s s e r t s on appeal tha t the p r e t r i a l publ ic i ty 
in h is case was so massive and pre jud ic ia l tha t i t presumptively 
denied him an impartial j u ry . He refers th i s Court to a number 
of news a r t i c l e s and t e lev i s ion repor ts to support h is argument. 
Defendant a lso refers to a survey wherein 93% of 401 randomly 
targeted reg i s te red voters had heard about defendant 's case and 
7 8% had formed a d e f i n i t e belief tha t defendant was g u i l t y . 
The mere demonstration tha t some dissemination of news 
thought to be pre judic ia l to a defendant has occurred does not 
normally e n t i t l e him to prevai l on a motion for change of venue. 
S ta te v. Wood. 648 P.2d 71 , 89 (Utah 1982)/ c e r t , denied. 459 
U.S. 988 (1982); State v. P i e r r e , 572 P.2d 1338, 1349-50 (Utah 
1977), c e r t , denied . 439 U.S. 882 (1978). As noted in Wood; 
"The mere general showing of publ ic i ty 
thought to be adverse to a party is not 
su f f i c i en t to require a change of venue 
except in the most extraordinary cases . In 
the usual s i t u a t i o n , the movant must a t l e a s t 
make a showing tha t the al legedly p re jud ic ia l 
mater ia l reached the veniremen, so tha t a 
foundation i s l a id for the p o s s i b i l i t y of 
actual b i a s . " Northern Cal i fornia 
Pharmaceutical Association v. United S t a t e s . 
306 F.2d 379, 383 (9th C i r . 1962). 
648 P.2d a t 89 (footnote omit ted) . In Codianna v. Morris f 660 
P.2d 1101 (Utah 1983), the Court s imi lar ly observed: 
An accused can be denied a f a i r t r i a l 
where the process of news-gathering i s 
allowed such a free rein t ha t i t intrudes 
into every aspect of a t r i a l and crea tes a 
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"carnival atmosphere" and where the p u b l i c i t y 
i s so weighted against the defendant and so 
extreme in i t s impact that members of the 
jury are encouraged to form strong 
preconceived views of h i s g u i l t . Sheppard v . 
Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 , 358, 86 S.Ct. 1507 f 
1519, 16 L.Ed.2d 600 (1966) . Neverthe less , 
"pretr ia l publ ic i ty—even pervas ive , adverse 
publ i c i ty—does not inev i tab ly lead to an 
unfair t r i a l . " Nebraska Press Assoc iat ion v . 
S tuart , 427 U.S. 539, 4 , 96 S.Ct. 2791, 2800, 
49 L.Ed.2d 683 (1976) . 
660 P.2d a t 1111. And, the burden i s on the defendant to show 
that p r e t r i a l news coverage has generated community b ias to such 
a degree that the r i g h t to a f a i r and impartial t r i a l has been 
put in jeopardy. Wood, 648 P.2d at 88; Utah R. Crim. P. 29(e) 
(Utah Code Ann. & 77-35-29 (e) (1982) ) . 
Defendant argues that the pretrial publicity in his 
case was so massive and prejudicial that it presumptively denied 
him an impartial jury. The law concerning inherently prejudicial 
publicity was largely developed in three major United States 
Supreme Court decisions—Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 
(1966); Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965); and Rideau v. 
Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723 (1963). For example, in Sheppard the 
Court stated: 
tWlhere there is a reasonable likelihood that 
prejudicial news prior to trial will prevent 
a fair trial, the judge should . . . transfer 
it to another county not so permeated with 
publicity. 
384 U.S. at 363. In Pierre, this Court interpreted those cases: 
Concerning Rideau, Estes and Sheppard, the 
Supreme Court in Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. 
794 at 799, 95 S.Ct. 2031, at 2036, 44 
L.Ed.2d 589, said that these cases " . . . 
cannot be made to stand for the proposition 
that juror exposure to information about 
. . • news accounts of the crime with which 
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he i s charged alone presumptively deprives 
the defendant of due process ." Rather these 
cases must be resolved taking the t o t a l i t y of 
circumstances into account. 
572 P.2d a t 1349-50. For the same reasons the Court did not find 
the refusa l to order a change of venue in P i e r r e , a highly 
publ ic ized case f to be an abuse of d i s c r e t i o n , the Court should 
find no error here . A review of t h i s case leads one to the 
ident i ca l conclus ion that "this i s not one of those exceptional 
cases where p r e t r i a l p u b l i c i t y exacerbated by State complicity 
encouraged the jurors to form such strong preconceived views of 
defendant's g u i l t as to be considered inherently pre jud ic ia l 
against him." P i e r r e , 572 P.2d at 1349. See a l so Codianna, 660 
P.2d at 1112.X 
Furthermore, Sheppard, E s t e s , and Rideau are a l l 
d i s t ingu i shab le from the instant ca se . In Sheppard the defendant 
was examined for f i ve hours without counsel during a three day 
1
 Nor does defendant's case represent the "unusual case" l i k e , 
for example, Pamplin v. Mason, 364 F.2d 1 (5th Cir . 1966) , and 
Maine v. Superior Court of Mendocino County, 68 Cal* 2d 37 5 , 6 6 
Cal . Rpcr. 724, 438 P.2d 372 (1968) (both c i t ed by t h i s Court in 
State v. Wood, 648 P.2d at 89 n. 21) , where the courts * 
demonstrated an increased s e n s i t i v i t y to the e f f e c t of community 
bias on the fa i rnes s of a t r i a l . In Pamplin, the defendant was a 
c i v i l r i gh t s leader in a community of l e s s than 30,000 who had 
been charged with aggravated assau l t upon a loca l p o l i c e o f f i c er 
committed after he had been arrested in the f i r s t r a c i a l 
demonstration ever staged in the community. There were d e f i n i t e 
s igns of an intense community h o s t i l i t y toward the defendant. In 
Maine, tne defendants were strangers in a small community; the 
v ic t ims of the crime were prominent members of that community; 
one of the v ict ims was the object of community-wide concern and 
i n t e r e s t ; newspaper p u b l i c i t y included references to a purported 
confess ion by one of the defendants; and f i n a l l y , the two 
opposing counsel were p o l i t i c a l opponents in an upcoming 
e l e c t i o n . C lear ly , a cumulation of unusual circumstances 
comparable to those in Pamplin and Maine did not e x i s t in the 
community where defendant was t r i e d . 
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inquest t e l e v i s e d l i v e from a high school gymnasium; the three 
Cleveland newspapers published the names and addresses of the 
jurors exposing them to express ions of opinion from cranks and 
f r i ends ; the prosecution made evidence ava i lable to the news 
media which was inadmissible and never offered a t t r i a l , and even 
the press in outs ide Sta tes made comments that i t would be a 
miracle i f defendant could rece ive a f a i r t r i a l in l i g h t of the 
performance by the Cleveland p r e s s . In Estes the two-day 
p r e t r i a l hearing, the opening and c los ing arguments of the S t a t e , 
and the return of the j u r y ' s verd ic t were a l l t e l e v i s e d . The 
Estes Court was concerned about the impact of t e l e v i s i o n on the 
j u r o r s , on the testimony in the t r i a l , and on the defendant. The 
Court a l s o indicated that the presence of t e l e v i s i o n placed 
addit ional r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s on the Judge. In Rideau a f i lm of 
defendant's confess ion was shown on t e l e v i s i o n to approximately 
106,000 viewers in a community with a population of approximately 
150,000 people . 
In the present case defendant does not contend that the 
news reports gave f a l s e information or s tated f a c t s inadmissible 
in Court. Instead, defendant's only complaint i s that the 
"newspapers rehashed the basic f a c t s of the courthouse k i l l i n g " 
and repeated f a c t s about defendant's prior crimes. 
Defendant a l so f a i l s to e s t a b l i s h that he was ac tua l ly 
prejudiced by p r e t r i a l p u b l i c i t y . To support h i s argument, 
defendant does not even refer to any of the prospect ive jurors or 
the jurors f i n a l l y s e l ec ted in h i s c a s e , but instead r e l i e s 
s o l e l y upon a publ ic opinion p o l l he presented to the t r i a l court 
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which indicated that 93% of 401 randomly targeted reg is tered 
voters had heard about defendant's case and 7 8% had formed a 
d e f i n i t e b e l i e f that defendant was g u i l t y . Obviously f the t r i a l 
court was free to e x e r c i s e i t s d i s c r e t i o n when considering t h i s 
opinion p o l l , and to re j ec t i t outr ight i f i t thought t h i s was 
j u s t i f i e d . As noted in United States v . Haldeman, 559 F.2d 31 
(D.C. Cir . 1976) , c e r t , denied . 431 U.S. 902 (1977): 
[A] t r i a l judge . . . i s not required to 
accept expert testimony. S imi lar ly , the 
t r i a l court must a lso be accorded d i s c r e t i o n 
in assess ing the weight to be given expert 
evidence that i s submitted . . . in support 
of a pre tr ia l motion. Indeed, such 
d i s c r e t i o n i s pecul iar ly necessary where the 
expert evidence c o n s i s t s of the r e s u l t s of a 
publ ic opinion pol l—data that i s open to a 
var ie ty of errors . 
559 F.2d at 64 n. 43 . Nevertheless , based upon t h i s s ing le 
opinion p o l l , defendant leaps to the conclusion that the jury in 
h i s case must have been prejudiced against him. He boldly 
a s s e r t s that " t t lhe survey [o f ] d i s i n t e r e s t e d Sa l t Lake County 
voters i s a more object ive measurement of actual prejudice than 
the voir d ire responses . One must conclude 35% of the veniremen 
who held opinions as to Mr. Gardner fs g u i l t did not dec lare t h i s 
f a c t . " (Br. of App. at 3 3 ) . This i s nothing more than a bare 
a l l e g a t i o n of prejudice , which i s patent ly inadequate to j u s t i f y 
a change of venue. Wood, 648 P.2d at 88, c i t i n g . State v . 
G e l l a t l y . 22 Utah 2d 149, 449 P.2d 993 (1969) . In shor t , 
defendant has shown no actual prejudice that resul ted from the 
denial of h i s motion for a change of venue. State v. Shabata, 
678 P.2d 785, 791 (Utah 1984); P i e r r e . 572 P.2d at 1350. 
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Finallyf it is unlikely that venue could have been 
transferred to a county which was unfamiliar with this case. As 
defendant argues in his brief "[llocal television and radio news 
stations also gave the Gardner escape attempt extensive 
coverage." (Br. of App. at 29). Unlike many large states which 
have several television stations that broadcast locallyf Utah has 
three televion stations which broadcast throughout the entire 
state as well as areas of Idaho# Wyoming and Nevada. 
Defendant also argues that venue should have been 
changed because of the "unique circumstance of the scene of the 
crime being across the street from the courtroom." (Br. of App. 
at 30). Initially it should be noted that the case was 
transferred from the Metropolitan Hall of Justice to the City and 
County building (R. 419). Additionally/ as Judge Banks noted/ 
jurors often request to view the scene of the crime during a 
trial so they can better understand the evidence (R. 1177). 
Thus/ the fact that the case was tried in close proximity to the 
scene of the crime does not necessarily make the location of the 
t r i a l p r e j u d i c i a l t o t h e d e f e n d a n t . 
POINT I I 
TEE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT ERROR IB 
DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR RECUSAL 
P r i o r t o t r i a l / d e f e n d a n t moved t o r e c u s e Judge Banks 
a s t r i a l judge (R. 75 / 9 8 ) . The motion d id n o t a l l e g e a c t u a l 
b i a s on t h e p a r t of Judge Banks but i n s t e a d a l l e g e d an appearance 
of b i a s . S p e c i f i c a l l y / de fendant argued in h i s motion and on 
appeal t h a t he cou ld n o t r e c e i v e a f a i r t r i a l b e c a u s e : 1) t h e 
v i c t i m s worked in courtrooms l o c a t e d in the same b u i l d i n g as 
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Judge Banks1 courtroom, 2) the attempted escape and k i l l i n g 
occurred in a l oca t ion da i ly used by Judge Banks, and 3) the 
co l l eagues and a s s o c i a t e judges of Judge Banks would t e s t i f y 
against defendant at t r i a l . 
Judge Banks denied the motion for the following 
reasons: (1) he was not on the court block during the inc ident , 
(2) he had l imi ted contact in h is job with the wi tnesses to be 
c a l l e d , (3) he had l imi ted viewing of media coverage of the 
inc ident , and (4) the a f f i d a v i t did not support any actual b ias 
(R. 140) . 
Judge Banks c e r t i f i e d the matter to Judge Conder for 
h i s determination as to the su f f i c i ency of the a f f i d a v i t s (R. 
126 ) . Judge Conder found that the motion was without merit , and 
remanded the matter to Judge Banks (R. 144)• 
Defendant now argues on appeal that i t was not 
necessary to prove actual b i a s , only an appearance of b i a s . Both 
p a r t i e s agree that t h i s Court's d e c i s i o n in Haslam v. Morrison» 
113 Utah 14 , 190 P.2d 520 (1948) i s appl icable to the present 
c a s e . In Haslam the p e t i t i o n e r applied for a writ of mandate 
claiming that the judge was biased because in a prior t r i a l he 
had made arbitrary rul ings against p e t i t i o n e r and rudely 
interrupted p e t i t i o n e r while he was t e s t i f y i n g . The Court denied 
the writ finding that the p e t i t i o n fa i l ed to show b i a s . 
Defendant r e l i e s upon the fol lowing language in Haslam; 
" [ t lhe general pract ice in t h i s j u r i s d i c t i o n has been for judges 
to d i squa l i fy themselves whenever an a f f i d a v i t of b ias and 
prejudice against them has been f i l e d . As a general r u l e , we 
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think t h i s i s a commendable p r a c t i c e . " Haslam 190 P.2d a t 523. 
However, defendant overlooks the Court's further statement that 
"[ t ]he mere f i l i n g of an a f f i d a v i t of b ias and prejudice does not 
ipso facto d i squa l i fy a judge. He i s d i s q u a l i f i e d only i f he i s 
ac tua l ly biased and prejudiced, and that i s a matter to be 
determined by him in the f i r s t ins tance , s u b j e c t , of course , to 
review by t h i s court on appeal." Id. at 523. See a l so Wi l l i e v. 
Local Realty Co, , 113 Utah 260, 193 P.2d 429, 432 (Utah 1948) . 
Subsequent to Bag].am the Court in State v. Byinaton, 
200 P.2d 723 (Utah 1948) (overruled on other grounds in F i r s t 
Federal Savings and Loan Ass 'n . v . Schamanek. 6 84 P.2d 12 57, 1263 
(Utah 1984)) found that the t r i a l judge should have recused 
himself based upon h i s comments in a contempt proceeding wherein 
i t was c l ear that he f e l t the defendant was g u i l t y . The Court 
s tated that the defendant must e s t a b l i s h actual b ias and 
prejudice and the dec i s ion by the t r i a l court i s subject to 
review by t h i s Court. 
This Court appears to have adopted a standard that the 
party moving to recuse the judge must show b i a s . In Anderson v. 
Industr ia l Commission of Utah, 696 P.2d 1219 (Utah 1985) t h i s 
Court s tated "when a judge has previously been involved in a case 
as an at torney , there i s no need to show actual pre judice ." id.. 
a t 1221. 
Defendant r e l i e s upon several case s from other 
j u r i s d i c t i o n s ruling that the appearance of b ias can s u f f i c e to 
require a judge to recuse himself . These cases are 
d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e from the present c a s e . In Wilkett v . S t a t e , 674 
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P.2d 573 (Okla Crim. App. 1984) the judge stated t ha t he had had 
a number of "annoying" contacts from the defendant 's family prior 
to t r i a l . The cour t further referred to defendant 's motion for a 
new t r i a l as containing a bunch of l i e s . In People v. D i s t r i c t 
Court in and for Third Jud ic i a l D i s t r i c t . 192 Colo. 503, 560 P.2d 
828 (Colo. 1977) the case a t issue arose from an invest igat ion by 
the grand jury which was a lso invest igat ing the judge. In 
Potashnich v. Port City Const. Co. . 609 F.2d 1101 (5th C i r . 1980) 
c e r t , denied. 449 U.S. 820 (1980) the judge had been represented 
by one of the at torneys and further had business t ransac t ions 
with the same a t to rney . F ina l ly , in United States v. Columbia 
Broadcasting System. I n c . . 497 F.2d 107 (5th Ci r . 1974) the judge 
issued an order to show cause why the defendant should not be 
held in contempt for v io la t ing an order of the cour t . The judge 
trying the case was the pr inc ipa l actor in the factual issues to 
be determined and the ac ts committed by the judge were essen t ia l 
to the proof of the S t a t e ' s case . 
In the present case , j u s t as in Haslam. the a l lega t ions 
of defendant do not show a bias or pre judice . Defendant argues 
tha t because the incident occurred in the building where Judge 
Banks worked and further tha t Judge Banks had had minimal contact 
with the wi tnesses , who also worked in the same bui ld ing , t ha t he 
was biased against the defendant. This argument ignores the fact 
t ha t t h i s same a l l ega t ion of b ias would l i e against any judge in 
the Third D i s t r i c t Court. Fur ther , while Judge Banks may have 
been famil iar with some of the wi tnesses , none of the witnesses 
were other judges in the Third D i s t r i c t . The j u ry , not Judge 
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Banks , was t h e t r i e r of f a c t in t h e i n s t a n t case* Although Judge 
Banks ru led on e v i d e n t i a r y m a t t e r s , de fendant f a i l s to c i t e any 
i n c i d e n t s where Judge Banks made an erroneous r u l i n g based upon 
b i a s . Because de fendant f a i l e d t o show any b i a s or p r e j u d i c e 
on b e h a l f of Judge Banks , h i s motion for r e c u s a l was p r o p e r l y 
d e n i e d . 
POINT I I I 
THE CAPITAL SENTENCING PROCEDURES IN UTAH ARE 
CONSTITUTIONAL. 
Defendant a l l e g e s t h a t U t a h ' s c a p i t a l s e n t e n c i n g 
procedures are u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l because the aggravat ing 
c i r c u m s t a n c e s found by t h e jury in s e l e c t i n g a death s e n t e n c e are 
d u p l i c a t e d e l ements of the crime i t s e l f and t h u s , the burden of 
proof i s s h i f t e d t o the de fendant in t h e p e n a l t y p h a s e . 
Defendant f i r s t a s s e r t s t h a t Utah Code Ann. § 7 6 - 3 - 2 0 7 
(1985 )2 a l l o w s for unguided d i s c r e t i o n a r y i m p o s i t i o n of the 
death p e n a l t y because the aggravat ing c i rcumstance used to prove 
t h e f i r s t d e g r e e murder a t g u i l t phase i s r e i n t r o d u c e d a t p e n a l t y 
p h a s e . Thus, de fendant argues t h a t a jury cou ld v o t e for the 
p e n a l t y of d e a t h w i t h o u t any standard of a g g r a v a t i o n but the one 
found a t the g u i l t phase of the t r i a l . 
Defendant c i t e s w i t h p a r t i c u l a r emphasis C o l l i n s v . 
L o c k h a r t . 754 F.2d 258 ( 8 t h C i r . 1 9 8 5 ) , c e r t , d e n i e d . U .S . 
, 106 S .Ct . 546 (1985) where t h e c o u r t he ld t h a t i t was error 
t o submit t o the jury a t p e n a l t y phase the a g g r a v a t i n g 
2
 The per t inent port ions of § 76-3-207 are contained in Appendix 
A to t h i s b r i e f . 
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circumstance that "the cap i ta l felony was committed for pecuniary 
ga in ," when the defendant had been convicted at g u i l t phase of 
"the unlawful k i l l i n g of a human being [. . . whi le ] engaged in 
the perpetrat ion of . . • robbery." I&. at 263. This pract ice 
has commonly been referred to as "double counting" or "doubling 
up" of an aggravating circumstance. See C o l l i n s . 754 F.2d at 264 
n. 3; Leatherwood v . S t a t e . 435 So.2d 645, 648 (Miss. 1983) , 
c e r t , denied. 465 U.S. 1084 (1984). However, under the Arkansas 
s t a t u t e s a t i ssue in C o l l i n s , "a finding of k i l l i n g in the course 
of a l i s t e d felony was not i t s e l f s u f f i c i e n t to warrant the 
imposit ion of the death sentence ! ; ] [ t ]he jury a l so had to find 
at l e a s t one aggravating circumstance, and t h i s circumstance had 
to be one of s ix l i s t e d in the s t a t u t e § 41-4711," which 
contained as one a l t erna t ive the "pecuniary gain" circumstance. 
Ib id . In other words, Co l l ins was found g u i l t y under the felony 
murder provis ion of Arkansas's f i r s t degree murder s t a t u t e , which 
did not require proof of an intent ional k i l l i n g . As with a l l 
t r a d i t i o n a l felony murder s t a t u t e s , a defendant i s g u i l t y of 
murder whether the k i l l i n g was intent ional or un intent iona l , so 
long as the k i l l i n g was committed during the commission of an 
enumerated f e lony .3 Under the Arkansas scheme, the s t a t e had to 
3 Trad i t iona l ly , felony murder refers to a k i l l i n g committed in 
the course of a f e lony , whether or not the k i l l i n g i s 
i n t e n t i o n a l . PERKINS and BOYCE, CRIMINAL LAW 61 (3d ed. 1982) . 
A felony murder provis ion i s contained in Utah's second degree 
murder s t a t u t e , Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203(1) (d) (Supp. 1985) . 
However, Utah's f i r s t degree murder s t a t u t e only uses designated 
f e l o n i e s as underlying "aggravating" circumstances for an 
in tent iona l or knowing k i l l i n g . See Utah Code Ann. § 76 -5 -
202(1) (d) (Supp. 1985) . 
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then prove the aggravating circumstance of pecuniary gain in 
order to render Col l ins e l i g i b l e for the death penal ty . But, by 
using t h a t p a r t i c u l a r circumstance to aggravate the felony 
murder, the Coll ins court believed tha t the s t a t e had ef fec t ive ly 
circumvented the s ta tu tory requirement of proving an aggravating 
circumstance, since pecuniary gain i s always an aspect of robbery 
(the underlying felony for the felony murder conv ic t ion) . 754 
F.2d a t 264. Thus, the s t a tu to ry aggravating circumstance did 
not perform i t s cons t i t u t i ona l ly necessary function of narrowing 
the c l a s s of persons e l i g i b l e for the death penal ty . I b i d . . 
c i t i n g Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980); Zant v. Stephens. 
462 U.S. 862 (1983). 
F i r s t , the Arkansas scheme applied in Col l ins is much 
d i f fe ren t from the Utah s t a t u t e s applied in defendant 's case . 
Defendant in the i n s t an t case was charged with " in ten t iona l ly or 
knowingly" causing the death of his victim under the following 
circumstances: 1) while defendant was confined in a cor rec t ional 
i n s t i t u t i o n § 76-5-202(1)(a) and/or; 2) while defendant knowingly 
created a g rea t r i sk of death to a person other than the vict im 
and the defendant § 76-5-202(1)(c) and/or; 3) for the purpose of 
effect ing the defendant 's escape from custody § 76-5-202(1)(e) . 
As previously noted, S 76-5-202(1)(a) , ( c ) , and (e) (Supp. 1987) 
(the S ta te notes t ha t the s t a t u t e was amended in 19 85, however, 
the amended por t ions are inappl icable in the present case) only 
use the enumerated fac tors as underlying "aggravating" 
circumstances to render an in ten t iona l or knowing k i l l i n g f i r s t 
degree murder ra ther than second degree murder, gee Utah Code 
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Ann. S 76-5-203(1) (a) (Supp. 1985) . One convicted under § 76 -5 -
202(1) (a) , (c) or (e) i s e l i g i b l e for the death penalty and 
t echn ica l l y could be sentenced to death without proof of any 
aggravation in addit ion to the felony aggravating circumstance 
found beyond a reasonable doubt a t g u i l t phase. However, 
contrary to defendant's a s ser t ion that a § 76-5-202(1) convic t ion 
w i l l r e s u l t in a mandatory death sentence i f no evidence of 
mi t igat ion i s presented/ Br. of App. at 45, after such a 
conv ic t ion the jury i s not required to return a death v e r d i c t . 
I t must f i r s t hear evidence at a penalty phase and then determine 
whether to ta l aggravation outweighs t o t a l mi t iga t ion , and- the 
death penalty i s appropriate in that part icular case . Wood. 648 
P.2d at 81 . During the penalty hearing, the defendant has an 
opportunity to put on evidence of s tatutory mit igat ing f a c t o r s . 
S 76-3-207 (2) ( a ) - ( f ) (see fn . 2 ) . He or she may a l so present 
"any other f a c t l s ] in mi t igat ion of the penal ty ." § 76 -3 -
207(2) (g) • Defendant f a i l s to recognize the di f ference between 
the burden he c a r r i e s to go forward with evidence and the burden 
of proof beyond a reasonable doubt that i s placed upon Jthe S t a t e . 
See Pierre v. Morris. 607 P.2d 812, 815 (Utah 1980) . 
Unlike the s i t u a t i o n noted in C o l l i n s , the Utah scheme 
narrows the c l a s s of persons e l i g i b l e for the death penalty with 
the requirement that a t l e a s t one statutory aggravating 
circumstance be proved beyond a reasonable doubt as an element of 
c a p i t a l murder a t the g u i l t phase of the t r i a l . § 76-5-202 . The 
finding of an in tent iona l k i l l i n g , coupled with the aggravating 
circumstance, makes the defendant e l i g i b l e for the death penal ty . 
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Then, "las with the Texas scheme upheld in Jurek v . Texas, 42 8 
U.S. 262 (1976) 3 f the Utah system ensures that the jury w i l l have 
before i t information regarding the individual c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of 
the defendant and h i s o f f ense , including the nature of the crime 
and the defendant's character , background, h i s t o r y , mental 
cond i t ion , and physical condi t ion ," Andrews v. Shulsen, 600 F. 
Supp. 408, 423 (D. Utah 1984) c i t i n g § 76-3-207; af f'd 802 F.2d 
1256 (10th Cir . 1986); Cal i fornia v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 1004, 
(1983) , before the death e l i g i b l e defendant i s sentenced. 
Indeed, in defendant's case t h i s type of information was 
presented to the jury (R. 2607-2888) . F i n a l l y , the defendant 
sentenced to death rece ives automatic and "comprehensive review 
of the e n t i r e c a s e , including a review of a sentence of death to 
determine i f that sentence resul ted from prejudice or arbitrary 
ac t ion or was d isproport ionate to the penalty [ s i c ] , 1 1 P i e r r e , 572 
P.2d at 1345. Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-206(2) (1978) . Therefore, 
in Utah, although one convicted of f i r s t degree murder does enter 
the penalty phase with a b u i l t - i n aggravating circumstance, t h i s 
obviously was the i n t e n t of the l e g i s l a t u r e . An i n i t i a l 
narrowing occurs at g u i l t phase4 and then further narrowing based 
upon addit ional indiv idual ized information occurs a t penalty 
phase—a procedure that does not run afoul of Godfrey. Thus, 
there i s not the "doubling up" condemned in C o l l i n s , where the 
robbery circumstance e f f e c t i v e l y served to render the defendant 
4
 An in tent iona l or knowing k i l l i n g without an aggravating 
circumstance defined under § 76-5-202 i s second degree murder. 
§ 7 6 - 5 - 2 0 3 ( 1 ) ( a ) . 
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gui l ty of f i r s t degree murder under the t r ad i t i ona l felony murder 
ru le (see fn. 3) and also to make him e l i g i b l e for the death 
penalty—something the Eighth Ci rcu i t believed was never intended 
under Arkansas law and which created the " fa i lu re to narrow" 
v io l a t i on ident i f ied in Godfrey and Zant. Co l l i n s , 754 F.2d a t 
265. In f a c t , had the Arkansas s t a t u t e s been more l i k e Utah ' s , 
the Col l ins court may well have found no cons t i tu t iona l 
v i o l a t i o n . Ib id . In shor t , the s i tua t ion in Coll ins i s 
d i s t inguishab le from tha t in defendant 's case . 
S ign i f i can t ly , other courts have rejected "double 
counting" challenges s imi lar to tha t made in Co l l i n s . For 
example, holding tha t the appl icat ion of Miss i s s ipp i f s cap i t a l 
punishment s t a t u t e s did not r e s u l t in a rb i t r a ry imposition of the 
death penalty in v io la t ion of Furman. the Mississ ippi Supreme 
Court s t a t ed : 
Under our cap i ta l murder s t a t u t e , when 
an accused i s found gui l ty of cap i t a l murder 
ar is ing out of a robbery, he then becomes 
subject to a jury finding tha t he should be 
executed i t the jury fee ls t ha t the fac t s j u s t i fy i t . However, h is execution i s not 
mandated and the jury may properly find tha t 
he should be sentenced to l i f e in pr ison. 
They may so find whether the defendant puts 
on any evidence of mit igat ing circumstances 
or not . This i s a far cry from the old 
s t a t u t e which mandated execution upon 
conviction of a cap i t a l offense. 
The a p p e l l a n t ' s argument tha t he en te r s 
in to the sentencing phase of the bifurcated 
t r i a l with one s t r i k e against him is correc t 
in one s e n s e — i . e . , if he had not been 
convicted of a cap i t a l offense, there would 
be no need for the sentencing hearing and he 
would simply be sentenced to serve a l i f e 
term. This does not mean though tha t the 
procedure is unfair or f au l ty . 
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At the sentencing hearing appel lant may 
put on evidence of mit igat ing circumstances 
of an unlimited nature pursuant to s e c t i o n 
99-19-101(6) (Supp. 1982) and Washington v. 
S t a t e . 361 So.2d 61 (Miss. 1978) , so as to 
convince the jury that he should not be 
executed. 
Leatherwood . 435 So.2d a t 650. In Adams v . Wainwriqht, 709 F.2d 
1443 (11th Cir . 1983) , c e r t , denied. 464 U.S. 1063 (1984) , the 
Eleventh Circu i t rejected the defendant's argument that F l o r i d a ' s 
system made the "death penalty the 'automatical ly preferred 
sentence1 in any felony murder case": 
The short answer i s that the United Sta tes 
Supreme Court has upheld the Florida death 
penalty s t a t u t e , including neces sar i ly the 
use of t h i s s tatutory aggravating f a c t o r . 
P r o f f i t t v. F lor ida . 428 U.S. 242, 96 S.Ct. 
2960, 49 L.Ed.2d 913 (1976) . Florida does 
not mandate the death penalty in a l l felony 
murder c a s e s . The defendant i s not precluded 
under Florida law from presenting any 
mit igat ing f a c t o r s . 
709 F.2d a t 1447. £ee a l so Gray v. Lucas. 677 F.2d 1086, 1104-05 
(5th Cir . 1982) , c e r t , denied. 461 U.S. 910 (1983); Whalen v. 
S t a t e , 492 A.2d 552, 565-68 (Del. 1985) , and cases c i t ed there in; 
Dobard v. S t a t e , 435 So.2d 1338, 1344 (Ala. Cr. App. 1982) , c e r t . 
denied , 464 U.S. 1063 (1984) . In l i g h t of the reasoning of these 
cases and given the significant differences between Collins and 
defendant's c a s e , the Court should r e j e c t defendant's "double 
counting" argument. 
POINT IV 
THIS COURT HAS ALREADY DETERMINED THAT UTAH'S 
DEATH PENALTY IS NOT"UNCONSTITUTIONAL ON ITS 
FACE. 
Defendant argues that Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-206 (197 8) 
and Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-207 (Supp. 1985) , Utah's death penalty 
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statutes/ are unconstitutional on their face because they provide 
a penalty that constitutes cruel and unusual punishment and which 
is violative of due process and equal protection. These claims 
were resolved against defendant by this Court in State v. Pierre, 
572 P.2d 1338 (Utah 1977)
 f c e r t , denied , 439 U .S . 882 (1978) and 
need not be rehashed a t l e n g t h in the c o n t e x t of t h i s c a s e . 
Whether c a p i t a l punishment i s s o c i a l l y j u s t i f i a b l e i s a 
l e g i s l a t i v e d e c i s i o n . Gregg v . G e o r g i a , 428 U .S . 1 5 3 f 174-76 
(1976) . The Utah L e g i s l a t u r e has concluded t h a t c a p i t a l 
punishment s e r v e s a v a l i d s o c i a l purpose and t h i s Court should 
n o t d i s t u r b t h a t c o n c l u s i o n . S t a t e v . Norton , 675 P.2d 577/ 588 
(Utah 1 9 8 3 ) / c e r t , d e n i e d , 466 U .S . 9 4 2 / ( 1 9 8 4 ) ; Andrews v . 
S h u l s e n , 600 F . Supp. 408/ 432 (D. Utah 1 9 8 4 ) / af f 'd 802 F.2d 
1256 (10th C i r . 1986) . 
POINT V 
SECTION 7 6 - 3 - 2 0 7 IS NOT OVERBROAD AND VAGUE 
AND DOES NOT GIVE THE JURY UNLIMITED 
DISCRETION TO IMPOSE THE DEATH PENALTY. 
Defendant a s s e r t s t h a t Utah Code Ann. § 7 6 - 3 - 2 0 7 (Supp* 
1985) 5 is indistinguishable from pre-Furman v. Georgia,* 408 U.S. 
238 (1972) / statutes that have been struck down because they gave 
the sentencing body nearly complete discretion in fixing the 
penalty in a capital case. However/ the application of § 76-3-
207 hardly gives the sentencer total discretion. In State v. 
Pierre, the Court made this clear: 
5
 The pertinent portions of § 76-3-207 are contained in Appendix 
A to this brief. 
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In Utah, the burden being on the State 
to convince the jury that the death penalty 
i s appropriate by proof of to ta l aggravation 
outweighing t o t a l m i t i g a t i o n , though writ ten 
f indings are not required, the basic concern 
mentioned by Mr. J u s t i c e Stewart in Gregg» at 
428 U.S. 189, 96 S.Ct. 2932, "to minimize the 
r isk of wholly arbitrary and capric ious 
action" i s more f u l l y s a t i s f i e d with respect 
to a standard of proof, we submit, than those 
standards approved in Gregg and Jurek: and 
par t i cu lar ly when the standard of proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt obtains in the 
g u i l t phase in Utah to find the crime of 
murder of which aggravating circumstances are 
a part . 
572 P.2d at 1348. After a comprehensive review of Utah's cap i ta l 
sentencing scheme, the federal d i s t r i c t court for Utah recent ly 
arrived a t a s imi lar conc lus ion . Andrews v . Shulsen, 600 F. 
Supp. 498, 420-25 (D. Utah 1984) , a f f 'd 802 F.2d 1256 (10th Cir . 
1986) . There, the court s ta ted: 
The Utah system, l i k e the Texas 
procedure, provides for ca tegor ica l narrowing 
at the d e f i n i t i o n stage by requiring that at 
l e a s t one statutory aggravating circumstance 
be proven beyond a reasonable doubt as an 
element of c a p i t a l murder at the g u i l t phase 
of the t r i a l . The Utah system also provides 
for indiv idual ized determination a t the 
s e l e c t i o n stage through i t s bi furcated 
sentencing proceeding, and provides 
meaningful appe l la te review. The court 
therefore concludes that the s tructure of the 
s t a t u t e and i t s appl icat ion to p e t i t i o n e r are 
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l . 
600 F. Supp. at 42 5. This i s even more true s ince t h i s Court 
ruled in Wood. 648 P.2d at 83, t h a t , at penalty phase, the s t a t e 
must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the t o t a l i t y of 
aggravating circumstances outweighs the t o t a l i t y of the 
mit igat ing c ircumstances , and the death penalty i s appropriate—a 
standard which was applied in defendant's case (R. 612-618) . As 
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the Court s tated in Andrews v . Shulsen, 80 2 F.2d 12 56 (10th Ci r . 
1986) : 
A prescribed l i s t of re levant factors guides 
the j u r y ' s ul t imate sentencing decis ion , and 
the requirement tha t aggravating outweigh 
mit igat ing circumstances d i r e c t s the jury to focus 
upon factors favoring leniency versus death . 
The j u r y ' s d i sc re t ion i s "sui tably d i rec ted 
and l imited so as to minimize the r isk of 
wholly a rb i t r a ry and capricious ac t ion . 
802 F.2d a t 1262. 
Defendant argues that § 76-3-207 is unconstitutional as 
applied to him because of the following instruction given to the 
jury: 
The law provides tha t evidence may be presented 
to you as to any matter the Court deems relevant 
to the sentence/ including but not l imited to the 
nature and circumstances of the crime, the 
defendant 's character / background, h i s to ry , 
mental and physical condi t ion, and any other 
fac t s in aggravation or mi t iga t ion . (Emphasis 
added) (R. 613) . 
(Br. of App. a t 56) . 
In Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862 (1982) the Court 
s ta ted t h a t : 
[Sltatutory aggravating circumstances play a 
constitutionally necessary function at the 
stage of legislative definition: they 
circumscribe the class of persons eligible 
for the death penalty. But the Constitution 
does not require the jury to ignore other 
possible aggravating factors in the process 
of selecting, from among that class, those 
defendants who will actually be sentenced 
to death. What is important at the selection 
stage is an individualized determination on 
the basis of the character of the individual 
and the circumstances of the crime. 
(citations omitted) 462 U.S. at 878-79. See also Barclay v. 
FlPCide, 463 U.S. 939 (1983). 
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Defendant ignores the d e c i s i o n s by the Court in Zant 
and Barclay and instead urges t h i s Court to fol low Henry v. 
WfliPWrAghty 661 F.2d 56 (5th Cir . 1981)
 f vacated and remanded, 
457 U.S. 1114 (1982) . Defendant's suggest ion that t h i s Court 
follow Henry i s i n t e r e s t i n g s ince that court subsequently 
overruled i t s holding. In Henry v. Wainwriaht. 721 F.2d 990 (5th 
Cir . 1983) , c e r t , denied , 466 U.S. 993 , (1984) the court found 
that i t s prior dec i s ion "that i t i s Const i tut ional error for the 
sentencing authority to consider nonstatutory aggravating fac tors 
in determining whether to impose the death penalty" was in error . 
Henry. 721 F.2d at 993. The Henry court r e l i e d upon the dec i s i on 
in Barclay v. F lor ida , 463 U.S. 939, 950 (1983) which held that 
the Const i tut ion does not prohibi t the sentencing judge from 
considering nonstatutory aggravating circumstances in a l l c a s e s . 
Thus, the Henry court in i t s f ina l d e c i s i o n ruled that because 
the t r i a l court could re ly upon nonstatutory aggravating f a c t o r s , 
p e t i t i o n e r was not e n t i t l e d to habeas corpus r e l i e f . Henry, 721 
P.2d at 995. 
Defendant's re l iance upon Jordan v . Watkins* 6 81 F.2d 
1067 (5th Cir . 1982) , c l a r i f i e d sub nom. in Jordan v. Thigpen, 
688 F.2d 395 (5th Cir . 1982) , vacated on other grounds. U.S. 
, 106 S. Ct . 1942 (1986); and B e l l v. Watkins, 692 F.2d 999 
(5th Cir . 1982) c e r t , denied . 464 U.S. 843 (1983) i s a l s o 
misplaced. 
In Jordan, the t r i a l court did not l i m i t or def ine the 
number or nature of aggravating circumstances that may be 
considered by the 3ury in determining whether to sentence a 
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defendant to death. The trial court gave an instruction 
identical to one given in Jackson v. State, 337 So.2d 1242, 1256 
(Miss. 1976) to the jury: 
Proof beyond a reasonable doubt of the 
statutory elements of the capital offense 
with which the accused is charged shall 
constitute [a] sufficient circumstance to 
authorize imposition of the penalty of death 
unless the mitigating circumstances shown by 
the evidence outweigh the aggravating 
circumstances. 
6 88 F.2d at 397. The federal court found that: 
The ambiguity created by that paragraph 
stems from the fact that unless the jury is 
instructed that the only aggravating 
circumstances that it is allowed to consider 
are the statutory elements of the offense 
with which the accused is charged, it could 
fairly read an instruction which tracks the 
language of that paragraph (as did an 
instruction in this case) to permit it to 
consider other unspecified aggravating 
circumstances once it has found proof beyond 
a reasonable doubt of the statutory elements 
of the offense with which the accused is 
charged (and is therefore entitled to 
consider the death penalty). As stated in 
the panel opinion there is nothing in the 
jury instruction based on this paragraph to 
prevent the jury from considering any number 
of potentially arbitrary and irrelevant 
unspecified factors. 
688 F.2d at 397. To further compound the problem of ambiguous 
jury instructions the prosecutor in Jordan argued to the jury 
that "each of you have to determine what is an aggravating 
circumstance#" and the trial judge failed to correct this 
statement. 
In B e l l v. Watkins, 692 F.2d 999 (5th Cir . 1982) c e r t . 
denied, 464 U.S. 843 (1983) the t r i a l judge merely informed the 
jury that they must "consider the mit igat ing circumstances shown 
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by the Defendantf if any, and the aggravating circumstances shown 
by the S t a t e , if any, in ar r iv ing a t the sentence for the 
Defendant." !£ • a t 1011. 
Contrary to the general ins t ruc t ions given in Jordan 
and Bell the jury in the ins tan t case was careful ly ins t ructed as 
to speci f ic aggravating fac tors which i t could consider : 
The jury i s ins t ructed tha t i t can consider 
as aggravating circumstances the very matters 
which were aggravating circumstances in the 
g u i l t phase. Said aggravating circumstances 
upon which you were ins t ructed in the g u i l t 
phase were as follows: 
1. The defendant, Ronnie Lee Gardner, 
knowingly created a r isk of death to a person 
other tha t the vic t im, Michael Joseph 
Burdel l , and the defendant, Ronnie Lee 
Gardner. 
2 . The homicide was committed for the 
purpose of effecting the escape of the 
defendant/ Ronnie Lee Gardner, from lawful 
custody. 
3 . The defendant, Ronnie Lee Gardner, was 
previously convicted of a felony involving 
the use of t h rea t of violence to a person, 
to -wi t : Robbery on February 22, 19 80, and/or 
Robbery on September 17, 1981. 
You may consider as aggravating 
circumstances the nature and circumstances of 
the crime and any other fac t s in aggravation 
produced tha t r e l a t e to the nature and 
circumstances of the crime or the individual 
character of the defendant. 
(R. 615) . The jury was also provided with specia l i n s t ruc t ions 
regarding aggravating and mit igat ing circumstances surrounding 
the death penal ty . See Appendix B. 
In sum, $ 76-3-207 has been reviewed by t h i s Court, 
the federal d i s t r i c t court for Utah, and the tenth c i r c u i t and 
a l l cour t s have round t n i s s t a t u t e to be c o n s t i t u t i o n a l . The 
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jury ins t ruc t ions given in t h i s case were nei ther broad nor 
ambiguous and l imited the j u r y ' s d i sc re t ion in imposing the death 
penal ty . 
POIHT VI 
THE AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE CHARGED UNDER 
UTAH CODE AHN. § 7 6 - 5 - 2 0 2 ( 1 ) (h) IS CONSTITUTIONAL. 
Defendant was charged with murder in the f i r s t degree 
in v io l a t ion of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-202(1)(a) and/or (c) and/or 
(e) and/or (h) (1978 & Supp. 1983) (amended 1984 & 1985) in tha t 
the defendant in ten t iona l ly or knowingly caused the death of 
Michael Joseph Burdell under any of the following circumstances: 
1) The homicide was committed by a person 
who was confined in a correc t ional 
i n s t i t u t i o n / to -wi t : Utah Sta te Prison; 
and/or 
2) The defendant knowingly created a grea t 
r i sk of death to a person other than the 
vict im and the defendant; and/or 
3) The homicide was committed tor the 
purpose of effecting the defendant 's escape 
from lawful custody; and/or 
4) The defendant was previously convicted of 
a felony involving the use or th rea t of 
violence to a person, to -wi t : Robbery, on 
February 22, 1980, and/or Robbery, on 
September 17, 1981. 
(R. 41-42) . 
Defendant now complains on appeal that § 76-5-202(1) (h) 
violated his constitutional right to a fair trial. Specifically, 
defendant argues that "[nlotice of prior convictions read to a 
jury as part of the charging information before presentation of 
any evidence was prejudicial because of the tendency of the jury 
to then convict the defendant because he is a 'bad person1 rather 
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than because he was shown to be guilty ot the offense ot Capital 
Homicide." (Br. of App. at 63) . 
Prior to trial defendant made a motion in limine 
pursuant to Utah R. Evid. 404(a) and (b) (19 83) to prohibit the 
State from introducing evidence ot other crimes or wrongs 
committed or allegedly committed by the defendant, including 
evidence ot prior criminal convictions and acts of violence 
against the State's witnesses (R. 135). On August 5, 1985 the 
following transaction occurred: 
The Court: What is your — well* on your 
motions in limine, I don't know from the 
general character — I don't know what the 
State intends to do, but generally your 
motion would be well taken unless the 
defendant takes the stand and on cross-
examination — 
Mr. James Valdez: That would be our 
argument, Judge. 
The Court: Of course there are some things 
that would have to come in anyway, as I view 
the charges themselves. They would be 
elements of the crime. 
Mr. James Valdez: We just want to limit the 
amount that they bring in. Judge. I think 
they can bring in that he was convicted ot a 
violent crime, that he was in custody at the 
time, but we don't want them to bring in his 
entire records. 
Mr. Andrew Valdez: Unless he takes the 
stand. 
The Court: As I view that, only what he was 
committed to the Utah State Penitentiary for 
to the date of the crime, alleged crimes. 
Mr. Andrew Valdez: Okay. 
The Court: I don't know what the State's 
position is, but — 
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Mr. Stott: We don't know exactly what they 
mean by their motion. Our answer is 
specific. We are saying that if he takes the 
stand, obviously we will want to bring up 
information, questions concerning that. Some 
of the elements of the crime requires us to 
put proof on. Other than that, I don't know 
what they are talking about. 
Mr. James Valdez: We just want to limit the 
amount of proof that they put on as to 
elements of the crime. They can show he was 
in custody and convicted of a violent crime, 
but to bring in everything that he has been 
convicted of up to that point — 
The Court: No, they cannot do that. 
Mr. Andrew Valdez: And we are concerned 
about the guilty plea to a second-degree 
murder. 
The Court: That couldn't come in except in 
the penalty phase. 
(R. 117 9-82). As apparent by the above transaction defendant 
did not challenge the constitutionality of § 76-5-202(1) (h) and 
agreed that the State could show that defendant had been 
convicted of a violent crime. Although the defendant did not 
allege at trial that the above provision is unconstitutional, 
this Court has determined in ££a££_£j*_£3flJ:£fln, 675 P.2d 577 (Utah 
1983) , SSti» d£Di§£l 466 U.S. 942 (1984) , that on direct appeal in 
a capital case it will review the record for "manifest and 
prejudicial" error, even though no proper objection was made at 
trial. Id* at 581. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-202(1)(h) (Supp. 1983) (amended 
1984 & 1985) provides that: 
(1) Criminal homicide constitutes murder in 
the first degree if the actor intentionally 
or knowingly causes the death of another 
under any of the following circumstances: 
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(h) The actor was previously convicted of 
first or second degree murder or of a felony 
involving the use or threat ot violence to a 
person. For the purpose of this paragraph an 
offense committed in another jurisdiction, 
which it committed in Utah would be 
punishable as first or second degree murder, 
is deemed first or second degree murder. 
Thus, a conviction ot first or second degree murder or ot a 
felony involving the use or threat of violence to a person is an 
element of first degree murder. 
The purpose of subsection (h) is stated simply in 
commentary to the Model Penal Code: 
Perhaps the strongest popular demand for capital 
punishment arises where the defendant has a 
history of violence. Prior conviction of a 
felony involving violence to the person 
suggests two inferences supporting escalation of 
sentence: first, that the murder reflects the 
character of the defendant rather than any 
extraordinary aspect ot the situation, and second, 
that the defendant is likely to prove dangerous 
to life on some future occasion. Thus, prior 
conviction of a violent felony is included as a 
circumstance that may support imposition ot the 
death penalty. 
Model Penal Code § 210.6 commentary at 136 (1980) 
The State acknowledges that evidence of prior crimes 
is presumed prejudicial and "absent a reason for the admission of 
the evidence other than to show criminal disposition, the 
evidence is excluded." SiSi£-2^^5UDdsis r 6 99 P. 2d 73 8, 7 41 
(Utah 1985). However, "[elvidence of prior crimes is admissible 
if the evidence is relevant to prove a specific element of the 
crime for which a defendant is on trial." S£at£~XA_E3£h££i2r 712 
P.2d 192, 195 (1985), SfiJLt. dfiDlfiflf U.S. ___, 107 S. Ct. 64 
(1986) . 
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Detenaant relies upon three Utah cases wherein this 
Court found that due process was violated where the jury was 
allowed to consider prejudicial prior conviction evidence; 
however, in none of those cases, unlike the present case, was a 
prior conviction an element ot the crime with which detenaant had 
been charged. Because defendant's conviction involving a crime 
ot violence is an element of first degree murder, a valid reason 
existed for admission of the evidence, and the cases cited by 
defenaant are simply inapplicable. 
Defendant claims that Utah is the only state which 
permits the use of prior convictions to be considered as an 
aggravating circumstance in the guilt phase of a capital trial 
(Br. of App. at 62)• However, both Alabama and Oregon provide 
for the use of prior convictions in the guilt phase of a capital 
trial. 
Ala. Code § 13A-5-40(a)(13) (1975) provides: 
(a) The following are capital offenses: . . . 
(13) Murder by a detenaant who has been convicted 
of any other murder in the 20 years preceding 
the crime; . . . . 
In &££hllI_JU_S£3i£, 472 So.2d 650 (Ala. Cr. App. 1985), 
fiSSttiilSfl^QQ-QihSI-SIQilDdSi 472 So.2d 665 (Ala. 1985), defendant 
complained that the inclusion of a prior offense as an element ot 
first degree murder violated due process of law. 
The &iiliiii court stated that: 
Statutes which enhance the sentence are 
not violative of the due process clause, and 
do not create an unreasonable classification. 
The statute was obviously enacted with a view 
to the protection of society from a certain 
class of criminal with the belief that a 
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hardened criminal needed more severe 
punishment . . . . 
Furthermore, the section does not 
deprive the appellant of due process of law 
because it requires the use of a prior 
conviction in the indictment . . . • 
Moreover, the aggravating circumstances 
constitute an element of the capital offense 
and are required to be averred in the 
indictment, and must be proved beyond a 
reasonable doubt. The aggravating 
circumstances must be set forth in the 
indictment because the State is required to 
give the accused notice that a greater 
penalty is sought to be inflicted than for a 
first offense. 
(citations omitted). Id. at 657-58. 
Or. Rev. Stat. § 163.095(1)(c) (Repl. 1985) provides 
that the crime is aggravated murder if: 
Mtt]he defendant committed murder after 
having been convicted previously in any 
jurisdiction of any homicide, the elements of 
which constitute the crime of murder as 
defined in ORS 163.115 or manslaughter in the 
first degree as defined in ORS 163.118." 
In Siaifi-Y^-EatEr 69 Or. App. 365, 686 P.2d 437 (1984), 
Sfilt* dSDififl 6 91 P.2d 4 83 (Or. 19 84) defendant argued that the 
court erred in admitting evidence of his previous conviction to 
prove murder in the first degree. The court stated that: 
[i]t is apparent that, in order to prove 
defendant's guilt of aggravated murder in 
this case, it was necessary to prove 
defendant's prior conviction for first degree 
murder. Thus, evidence of the prior crime is 
not only relevant it is material to proot of 
the crime charged, and was not introduced to 
show defendant's criminal propensity. 
Although the prejudicial impact on a 
defendant in a murder case of having the 
jurors know that he committed first degree 
murder previously is strong, the defendant 
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may avoid that problem by stipulating to the 
prior conviction6 . . . . 
££££' 686 P.2d at 439. 
The JSatE court further r e l i e d upon the holding in 
JSpsnSfiI-Xjt-3!fixas/ 3 85 U.S. 55 4 (196 7) wherein the defendant 
claimed that admission of the prior convic t ion during the g u i l t 
determination phase ot the t r i a l offended the Fourteenth 
Amendment guarantee of due process : 
The Supreme Court rejected the 
c o n t e n t i o n s ta t ing that the admission of 
that type of evidence could be j u s t i f i e d by 
the S t a t e ' s va l id governmental i n t e r e s t in 
enforcing greater p e n a l t i e s against habitual 
offenders and that the jury i s expected to 
fol low l imi t ing i n s t r u c t i o n s . The court 
recognized that there might be other l e s s 
in trus ive ways of enforcing enhanced penalty 
p r o v i s i o n s , such as a bifurcated t r i a l , but 
s tated that the f a i l u r e to adopt an 
a l t e r n a t i v e procedure did not change the 
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r e s u l t . 
EfltE 6 86 P.2d at 440 . 7 jE5fi£ Slfifi Sigie_SA-B3Di£lS2Q/ 719 P.2d 4 4 
(Or. App. 1986), ££iiA denied 723 P.2d 325 (Or. 1986) 
(reaffirming Eats)• 
In the present case the information was read to the 
jurors (R. 1957A) and copies of judgments and convictions 
relating to defendant were admitted into evidence without 
objection. (R. 1979-80). No details ot the prior convictions 
* Oregon statutory law provides that the defendant has the choice 
of stipulating to the existence of his prior conviction or of 
having evidence of that conviction admitted in evidence. JSfiS Or. 
Rev. Stat S 163.103 (Repl. 1985). 
7 It is interesting to note that £E£D££I was reaffirmed in 
Marshall v. Lonberger, 459 U.S. 422, 438, n. 6 (1983), a case 
cited by defendant for the proposition that no cases exist 
addressing the present issue. 
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were admitted at the trial and the prosecutor did not repeatedly 
refer to the prior convictions or argue that the jury could infer 
from the previous convictions that defendant committed murder in 
this case. Sfi£ JSaiB 6 86 P.2d at 439, n.4. 
In addition, the following limiting instruction was 
given to the jury: 
INSTRUCTION NO. 10 
The fact that the defendant has been 
convicted of a felony, if such be a fact, may 
be considered by you for only one purpose, 
namely, in judging the credibility ot such 
testimony, except as it may apply to the 
material elements in one or more of the 
counts in this case. The fact of such a 
conviction does not necessarily destroy or 
impair the witness1 credibility, and it does 
not raise a presumption that the witness has 
testified falsely. It is simply one of the 
circumstances that you are to take into 
consideration in weighing the testimony of 
such a witness. 
(R. 3). Furthermore, the jury was instructed that before it 
could tind defendant guilty of first degree murder it must find 
that the defendant unlawfully caused the death of Michael Burdell 
either intentionally or knowingly and under an aggravating 
circumstance (R. 570, 5 82). Thus, the jury could not even 
consider the prior conviction unless it first found defendant had 
intentionally or knowingly killed the victim. Although the State 
recognizes that a further limiting instruction could have been 
given, i.e. that the prior conviction could not be used as 
evidence that defendant k i l l e d the v i c t i m , BlJthill 472 So.2d at 
657-58 , such an in s t ruc t ion was not requested by detenaant and 
manifest error did not occur in the f a i l u r e ot the t r i a l court to 
g ive sucn an i n s t r u c t i o n . £££ SiSifi-Yjt-Sffiitll# 7 00 P.2d 1106, 
1110 (Utah 1985) . 
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Even assuming the "prior convict ion" aggravating 
circumstance i s u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l t h i s Court should attirm the 
conv ic t ion because of the presence of two other aggravating 
f a c t o r s . And£SHS-2x-SJlUlSfiD# 802 F.2d 1256 f 1263 (10th Cir . 
198b)• The jury in the ins tant case c l e a r l y found that the 
defendant knowingly created a risk of death to a person other 
than the v ic t im and that the homicide was committed for the 
purpose ot e f f e c t i n g the escape of the defendant (R. 599) . 
POIHT VII 
THE TRIAL COORT DID NOT ERR IN NOT 
DISMISSING JUROR COPINGA FROM THE JURY. 
Defendant contends that the trial court erred in not 
removing juror Copinga because of his attitude towards the death 
penalty. Specifically, defendant contends that Mr. Copinga 
declared that he felt death was the most appropriate penalty in 
homicide cases and that he doubted his ability to impose a life 
sentence. 
Initially, defendant reserved his challenge on Mr. 
Copinga (R. 1416). The court subsequently heard argument on the 
challenge and took the matter under advisement (R. 1807-09)• The 
defendant later withdrew his challenge to Mr. Copinga (R. 1938). 
Because the defendant withdrew his challenge# this 
Court ordinarily would not review any objection not preserved at 
trial. £iai£_YjL_£3X£ll3# 714 P.2d 287 (Utah 1986). However, 
this Court has determined in SiaJt£_2*_H£l£SD' 675 P.2d 577 (Utah 
1983)
 r CfitJ;* denied. 466 U.S. 942 (1984) f that on direct appeal in 
a capital case it will review the record for "manifest and 
prejudicial" error, even though no proper objection was made at 
trial. Id* at 581. 
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In the instant case no error occurred. Mr. Copinga 
testified that if the aggravating circumstances did not outweigh 
the mitigating circumstances he could impose a life sentence (R. 
1407-08); that he would have to examine the evidence before he 
could determine which sentence, death or life imprisonment/ he 
could impose (R. 1409); and that he could follow the court's 
instructions on the law of the case (R. 1411-12). Finally, he 
testified that although he would prefer death over life 
imprisonment, he did not believe that everyone would make the 
same choice (R. 1415)• (5fi£ Appendix C for the complete voir 
dire of Mr. Copinga). 
POINT VIII 
NO ERROR WAS COMMITTED BY HAVING 
SECURITY GUARDS IN THE COURTROOM 
On the second day of the trial, defendant moved for a 
mistrial alleging that whenever the court recessed, security 
guards would surround defendant giving the impression to the jury 
that the defendant was dangerous (R. 2168-69). Defense counsel 
did not object to two of the guards sitting behind defendant (R. 
2170). The Court denied the motion stating that other than the 
two guards to which defendant did not have an objection there 
were only two other guards in the courtroom. Further, all guards 
were in civilian clothing and unarmed (R. 2170) • The court also 
ordered the defendant and the guards to remain seated until the 
jury was out of the courtroom (R. 2170-71). 
Defendant asserts on appeal that because excessive 
security guards surrounded defendant that the trial 3udge made it 
clear that defendant "was a violent person who needed to be 
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constant ly surrounded by secur i ty guards to protect soc i e ty and 
the jury" (Br. of App. at 7 1 ) . Defendant further complains that 
the t r i a l court made no finding t o j u s t i f y the use of extra 
secur i ty o f t i c e r s and in the absence of such a f inding 
defendant's conv ic t ion should be reversed. 
The presence of s ecur i ty guards in a criminal t r i a l i s 
a matter within the t r i a l c o u r t ' s d i s c r e t i o n . SjtSJtS-Sx-filS£Bt 44 
Wash. App. 671 , 722 P.2d 887 (1986); EfiQBlS-Yx-IflfQXa, 703 P.2d 
663 (Colo. Ct. App. 1985) . The presence oJt armed guards in the 
courtroom need not be j u s t i f i e d by the court or the prosecutor 
unless they are present in unreasonable numbers. PfifiBlfi-X* 
DataOr 127 Cal. Rptr. 618/ 545 P.2d 1322 (1976). Whether the 
presence of secur i ty guards in a courtroom i s inherently 
pre jud ic ia l to a defendant should be decided on a case by case 
b a s i s . jafllklSJ2&_5UJElynat _ U.S. , 106 S. Ct. 1340# 1346 
(1986) . 
The present case is somewhat similar to Hfilb£OfiJi_sx 
£lXDD/ ,_ U.S. / 106 S. Ct. 1340 (1986) wherein the 
defendant argued he was denied a fair trial by the presence ot 
four uniformed state troopers sitting in the first row of the 
spectator section. There# the Court stated that: 
While shackling and prison clothes are 
unmistakable indications of the need to 
separate a defendant from the community at 
largef the presence ot guards at a 
defendant's trial need not be interpreted as 
a sign that he is particularly dangerous or 
culpable. Jurors may just as easily believe 
that the officers are there to guard against 
disruptions emanating from outside the 
courtroom or to ensure that tense courtroom 
exchanges do not erupt into violence • • . • 
Our-society has become inured to the presence 
-45-
ot armed guards in most public places; they 
are doubtless taken for granted so long as 
their numbers or weaponry do not suggest 
particular otficial concern or alarm. 
(citations omitted) Id* at 1346. Even assuming a slight degree 
of prejudice was attributable to defendant by the presence of the 
guards, sufficient cause for the level ot security could be found 
in the State's need to maintain custody over a defendant who had 
been denied bail. Id* at 13 47. 
Finallyf the Court stated that when a federal court 
reviews a constitutional challenge to a state court proceeding 
the federal court should 
look at the scene presented to jurors and 
determine whether what they saw was so 
inherently prejudicial as to pose an 
unacceptable threat to defendant's right to a 
fair trial; if the challenged practice is not 
found inherently prejudicial and if the 
detendant fails to show actual prejudice, the 
inquiry is over. 
ifl. at 1348. 
Several courts have ruled that the presence of secur i ty 
guards was not inherently pre jud ic ia l to defendant. Sfifi 
flfiEJsinfififl-Yji-Sl}illJLDa£J:f 6 45 F. Supp. 37 4 (D. Wyo. 19 86) 
(presence of 8 b a i l i t f s during c a p i t a l murder t r i a l ) ; HatdfiS-S-t, 
KubilDflllr 581 F.2d 330 (2nd Cir . 1978) (presence of three 
uniformed guards, one of which sa t tnree f e e t behind defendant, 
during a manslaughter t r i a l ) ; CiiDD«2A«Siai£# 653 P.2d 1071 
(Alaska Ct. App. 19 82) (presence of two guards at t r i a l who a t 
various s tages were in uniforms with revolvers during t r i a l on 
f i r s t degree robbery and attempted murder); EeQBlS-Yx-Dlltan* 127 
Cal.Rptr. 618 f 545 P.2d 1322 (1976) (presence ot armed guards 
during trial on assault with a deadly weapon)• 
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In the present case defendant has failed to prove that 
what the jurors witnessed was "so inherently prejudicial as to 
pose an unacceptable threat to defendant's right to a fair 
trial." BfiltltafiJlf 106 S. Ct. at 134 8. The number of security 
guards in the instant case was minimal, four, and the guards were 
in civilian clothes and unarmed. Only two of the guards were 
positioned behind defendant and defendant did not object to those 
guards (R. 2170)• 
Defendant argues that the guards surrounded defendant 
whenever the court recessed giving the impression to the jury 
that defendant was dangerous. The State agrees that this method 
ot restraining defendant was not a good practice. However, the 
problem was brought to the attention ot the trial court early in 
the trial and the court cured the problem by ordering the 
defendant and the guards to remain seated until the jury was out 
ot the courtroom. Because the trial lasted several days it is 
likely that the jury forgot witnessing any restraint ot defenaant 
by the guards. 
Furtherf the trial court granted the reliet requested 
by defendant. Defense counsel argued that every time a recess 
was taken the guards jumped up and surrounded the defendant and 
that "unless an unobtrusive method can be worked out, we believe 
that Mr. Gardner is not receiving a fair trial . . . " (R. 2169) . 
When the trial court ordered defendant and the guards to remain 
seatedf the court found a less obtrusive method ot restraint and 
gave defendant the relief he requested. 
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Finally, if defendant thought that the action by the 
guards was inherently prejudicial to him, defendant should have 
requested that he be permitted to voir dire the jurors to 
determine if they were intluenced or biased by the presence of 
the guards. Because defendant has failed to prove that the 
presence of the guards was inherently prejudicial, the trial 
court did not err in failing to grant a mistrial. 
POINT IX 
THE TRIAL COURT DID HOT DENY DEFENDANT THE 
RIGHT TO CROSS-EXAMINE RICHARD THOMAS 
REGARDING DEFENDANT'S MENTAL STATE 
At trial, the State called Richard Thomas to testify as 
to events surrounding the attempted escape and shooting (R. 
2244). On cross-examination, the defendant questioned Mr. Thomas 
as to the defendant's demeanor during the above-mentioned acts. 
Defendant now argues that the trial judge interrupted the 
questioning ot the witness; and further questioning would have 
revealed that defendant was "glassy-eyed and incoherent" at the 
time ot the incident and was not acting with the requisite intent 
or knowledge for the commission of a first degree homicide (Br. 
ot App. at 75). 
Defendant is referring to the following exchange at 
trial: 
Mr. Andrew Valdez: So on April 5th when 
you were questioned and you told the 
investigators — 
Mr. Stott: Your honor, I think this is 
going beyond the point of recross. 
The Court: I am going to cut if off on 
both sides. I think it has been developed by 
both of you as to what was said. 
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Mr. Andrew Valdez: Can I ask one more 
questionf your honor? 
The Court: Yes, as long as it is not 
repetition* 
Q (By Mr. Andrew Valdez) on April 5th when 
you gave the statements to the investigators 
and you used those adjectives to describe Mr. 
Gardner, only three days had elapsed since 
the event itself; is that correct? 
A Probably correct, yes, sir. 
(R.2270). 
The State agrees with defendant that "[tlhe right to 
cross-examine is an invaluable right embodied in Article I, 
Section 12 ot the Utah Constitution and in the Sixth Amendment of 
the United States Constitution which assures the right to 
confrontation." £i3±£_3U_Ma£s£a5, 56 4 P.2d 13 86, 13 87 (Utah 
1977). However, it must also be recognized that "[t]he trial 
court's obligation to control the trial to prevent prejudice and 
waste of time must of course be weighed against the competing 
right of confrontation and the limiting ot cross-examination is 
within the sound discretion of the court." JJassiSS at 1388. 
The matter and extent of cross-examination is within 
the discretion of the trial judge and a conviction should be 
reversed by this Court only if that discretion is abused. Even 
it the trial court errs in limiting cross-examination, that error 
should not be reversed unless it is prejudicial. ££a.fc£_2.*. 
StfltiiS/ 581 P.2d 1015, 1017 (Utah 1978). 
In the instant case the defendant had ample opportunity 
to cross-examine the witness. Defense counsel asked the witness 
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if defendant recognized him0 (R. 2261, 2269), if defendant 
appeared "glassy-eyed and incoherent" (2263, 2265, 2266), and 
whether defendant appeared to be in a state of panic (R. 22b9). 
Further, the State asked Mr. Thomas to describe defendant's 
demeanor (R. 2261), and defendant's state of mind (R. 2267-2268). 
Defendant's only complaint on appeal is that had he 
"been allowed the necessary latitude in cross-examining Mr. 
Thomas a reasonable doubt about Mr. Gardner's mental state at the 
time of the homicide could have arisen in the juror's minds." 
(Br. of App. at 77). Defendant does not proffer what additional 
questions he would have asked or what additional information 
would have been provided by the witness. Instead, defendant 
appears to argue that given additional time to question the 
witness, defendant eventually would have received testimony 
favorable to his defense. 
The testimony established that Mr. Thomas did not 
believe the defendant recognized him (R. 2261), that at trial he 
did not remember whether defendant was "glassy-eyed and 
incoherent" (R. 2263), however, upon having his memory refreshed 
he recalled stating that defendant appeared "glassy-eyed and 
incoherent" (R. 2266). Based upon this testimony there was 
sufficient evidence before the jury to allow them to determine 
whether defendant possessed the requisite intent to commit a 
first degree homicide. Q£. SiaiS-SU-ClllJfciSf 542 P.2d 744 (Utah 
1975) (Court ruled that defense counsel was not unduly restricted 
8 The witness was employed by the Utah State Prison and knew 
defendant (R. 2261). 
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on cross-examination; the evidence e l i c i t ed adequately explored 
defendant's claims). 
POIHT X 
DEFENDANT'S PRIOR INCONSISTENT STATEMENTS 
HERE ADMISSIBLE FOR IMPEACHMENT REGARDLESS OF 
ANY FIFTH OR SIXTH AMENDMENT VIOLATIONS 
COMMITTED IN OBTAINING THEM. 
On rebuttal, the State called Wayne Jorgensen, a prison 
guard, to testify that while he was guarding defendant at the 
University Hospital on April 24, 19 85 defendant made 
incriminating statements (R. 2481-96)• These statements 
conflicted greatly with those defendant asserts for the first 
time on appeal that the statements were non-Mirandized and taken 
in violation ot the Fifth Amendment and also the Sixth Amendment 
right to counsel as described in £J3§5i3!l_JU-IJB.i£Sd_Si2i£.3# 377 
U.S. 201 (1964). He does not assert that the statements were 
coerced or otherwise involuntary. 
Defendant admits that he did not object at trial to the 
admission ot these statements but requests this Court to review 
the issue as manifest error under S£a±S_2.i..JSfl£JfcQ]l r 675 P.2d 577, 
581 Cfiti. denied/ 466 U.S. 942 (1986) (Utah 1983); and SiaJLfiJU 
Hfl2df 648 P.2d 71, 77 (Utah 1982) cetJfc. denied/ 459 U.S. 980 
(1982). Recognizing this Court's willingness to entertain 
arguments of manifest error in capital cases the State offers the 
following analysis. 
Assuming that defendant's statements were inadmissible 
in the State's case-in-chief under both the Fifth and Sixth 
Amendments, this Court may still find that it was not error to 
admit them in this case. Confessions obtained in violation of 
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Mi£jSllSa-Yx-Ai:i2finar 384 U.S . 436 (1966) have long been he ld 
a d m i s s i b l e f or impeachment p u r p o s e s . ]Ifl££is_.X.*-H£K-Xfl£]i# 401 
U . S . 222 ( 1 9 7 1 ) ; QifiSflXLJU-flMS' 4 2 0 u - s - 714 ( 1 9 7 5 ) ; Ufliifia 
StflifiS^Yx-BflMStfir 593 F.2d 3 7 6 , 379-80 (10th C i r . 1 9 7 9 ) . And the 
p r i n c i p l e was r e c e n t l y r e a t t i r m e d i n Q££SQD_Yx-J5l5£aslr 47 0 O.S. 
298# 307 ( 1 9 8 4 ) . The p o l i c y under ly ing t h e s e d e c i s i o n s i s t h a t a 
de fendant should n o t be a l lowed t o use the i l l e g a l method by 
which e v i d e n c e was obta ined as "a s h i e l d a g a i n s t c o n t r a d i c t i o n of 
h i s u n t r u t h s . " H3ld£I_Yj^UDii£d_£if l i£S# 347 U.S . 6 2 , 65 ( 1 9 5 4 ) . 
While a de fendant i s p r i v i l e g e d t o t e s t i f y i n h i s own d e f e n s e , 
the p r i v i l e g e does not i n c l u d e a r i g h t t o commit p e r j u r y . 
BaLLlS* 401 U.S . a t 2 2 5 . Using t h i s same r e a s o n i n g , the Tenth 
C i r c u i t he ld t h a t s t a t e m e n t s taken in v i o l a t i o n of t&aS.Sl^h may 
a l s o be used by the s t a t e for impeachment p u r p o s e s . I2nit£d 
Si£i£3_Xx_M££5aDamafl, 606 F.2d 9 1 9 , 924-25 (10th C i r . 1 9 7 9 ) . 
In this case, defendant not only made sweeping 
assertions of memory loss about what occurred when he shot 
Michael Burdell and denied possessing the intent to kill, he 
denied speaking to Jorgensen at all, both on cross-examination 
and in surrebuttal (R. 2467, 2499). The State's use of his prior 
inconsistent statements was proper impeachment. This Court need 
not engage in lengthy analysis of defendant's fifth and sixth 
amendment rights but may find that, even assuming defendant's 
rights were violated by the conversation with Jorgensen, the 
statements were properly admitted. 
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POINT XI 
THE TRIAL COURT'S JDRY INSTRUCTION ON 
MANSLAUGHTER CORRECTLY DEFINED THAT OFFENSE. 
At trial, the defense requested a jury instruction on 
the theory of manslaughter unaer "extreme mental or emotional 
disturbance", under the then existing version of Utah Code Ann. § 
76-5-205(1)(b) (1982). The court grantea the request but 
substituted its own Instruction 34 for defendant's requested 
Instruction 21. Defendant argues that while his requested 
Instruction 21 correctly interprets Utah's manslaughter statutef 
Instruction 34 effectively precludes the jury from considering 
the manslaughter theory. Such arguments are based on defendant's 
misreading ot the language and intent of § 76-5-205. (Although 
defendant's brief repeatedly refers to "section 203," respondent 
assumes that the claims are truly based on § 76-5-205). 
Defendant points out quite extensively that the court 
was obliged to give lesser-offense instructions to the jury. 
Respondent does not dispute this point. The trial court did give 
a lesser-offense instruction and one which correctly expressed 
the requirements under § 76-5-205. 
Although originally modeled after the Model Penal Code 
S 210.3, subsequent amendments to S 76-5-205 departed from its 
provisions. For instance, when the statute was first enacted it 
adopted an extremely subjective view point: 
(1) Criminal homicide constitutes 
manslaughter it the actor: 
(b) Causes the death of another unaer the 
influence of extreme mental or emotional 
disturbance for which there is a reason-
able explanation or excuse; 
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(2) The reasonableness of an explanation or 
excuse of the actor . . • shall be determined 
from the viewpoint of a person in the actor's 
situation under the circumstances as he 
believes them to be* 
Utah Code Ann. S 76-5-205 (1973) (amended 1975, 1985). The 
statute was amended in 1975, eliminating paragraph (2), and the 
subjective viewpoint, altogether. This court never interpreted 
the effects of that change but did express an intent to depart 
from the originally broader scope of murder mitigation under the 
1973 manslaughter statute in SJtaifi.Sji^ ClSXtaDt 658 P.2d 62 4 (Utah 
1983)• This court used the following language in refusing a 
manslaughter instruction: 
The passage of time between the fight and 
defendant's return to the bar tends to negate 
the "heat of passion" explanation. • . The 
evidence offers no rational basis tor the 
jury to conclude that defendant's passion 
preponderated over his malice so as to 
satisfy the requirement of "extreme mental or 
emotional disturbance." 
Id. at 626. By using "heat of passion" language this court 
placed limitations on the scope of manslaughter mitigation, as 
opposed to the broader scope o± the Model Penal Code. 
In addition, the legislature has expressed a similar 
intent to narrow the use of mitigation beyond the Model Penal 
Code proposals. In 1985, the legislature amended § 76-5-205 
eliminating "mental-disturbances" as a basis for mitigation under 
the statute. Furthermore, the amended statute explicitly 
includes an objective viewpoint and abandons the subjectivity ot 
the Model Penal Code: 
(2) The reasonableness of an explanation or 
excuse . . . shall be determined from the 
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view point of a reasonable person under the 
then existing circumstances. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-205 (Supp. 1985). These modifications 
merely clarify the limitations to the manslaughter mitigation 
which the legislature intended when it removed the subjective 
element in 1975. 
In light of the language and history ot S 76-5-205, the 
instruction prepared by the defendant is erroneous. It stated: 
In order to determine whether or not there 
was a reasonable explanation you must 
consider the facts and evidence from the 
viewpoint of the defendant, under 
circumstances as he believed them to be. 
Defendant's proposed instruction No. 21. This instruction 
incorporated language that was specifically eliminatea from the 
statute in 1975. On the other hand, instruction 34 properly 
retlects the language and intent of § 76-5-205 as it existed in 
early 1985. The requirement that the "disturbance" be triggered 
by something external from defendant is consistent with the 
language and intent of the statute as illustrated above. 
Furthermore, defendant poses a bare claim that the 
instruction was prejudicial, failing to present an argument -
credible or not - to indicate what sort of factors were precluded 
from the jury's consideration. Defendant alludes to an abstract 
group ot "disturbances" which "developed over periods longer than 
an instant." He apparently alleges that the instruction required 
that the disturbances have occurred within a particular time 
frame. However, while an instruction requiring that the 
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triggering factor be fiiiddfiLD may have such an etfect, instruction 
34 does not restrict the possible disturbance to any particular 
period ot time* 
Next, in arguing that his manslaughter theory was 
improperly precluded from jury consideration by limitations to 
its scope, defendant offers dicta espoused by this court in a 
single case. S£at£_Y*_£axi2.La, 550 P.2d 1298 (Utah 1976), held 
that the words "extreme", "mental" and "emotional" as used in § 
76-5-205 must be given individual, dictionary meanings. In so 
holding this court explained that to give the words technical, 
unified meaning would impose "arbitrary limitations] on the 
nature of the antecedent circumstances that may justify a 
mitigation." Id. at 1303 (citing from Tentative Draft/ No. 9, p. 
46 A.L.I., Model Penal Code). In the instant case, the trial 
court properly instructed the jury on the meaning of those words. 
Yet, defendant seems to imply that the instruction places 
"arbitrary limitations" within the meaning of Gaxifila* Such an 
implication presupposes a much too broad view ot the holding ot 
£axi£la* A narrow reading of Saxiflla is more consistent with the 
history of this court's decisions and the legislative intent to 
limit rather than to expand the circumstances of mitigation, as 
illustrated above. 
Nevertheless, even the broadest reading ot Sasifila 
would fail to support defendant's claim tnat instruction 34 
places "arbitrary limitations" on § 76-5-205. While the comment 
mentioned by the court in fiasiflla rejects the narrow provocation 
standard, the Model Penal Code standard it appears to adopt 
supports some limits to the circumstances under which the 
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mitigation theory applies. One such limitation is imposed when 
the disturbance arises from the conduct of the defendant* 
[A]n emotional disturbance is excusable "if 
it is occasioned by any provocation/ event or 
situation £fli_Hhi£h_ih£-S£££Ba£I_H3S-llfiJt 
£UlBaJ2lX-I££B2DSikl£." Under this 
formulation, extreme emotional disturbance 
will not reduce murder to manslaughter if £,h£ 
QW-mzn£al-&i&£uLhanQ&&jL-&\izh-a&-hx-inxQlxLxi2 
ium££l£«in_a_£iim£• 
Model Penal Code § 210#3 (official draft & revised commentsf 
1980), Part II, at 64 (emphasis added) gufiiiag the National 
Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal Law, Brown Commission 
Final Report § 1602(b). While the Model Penal Code adopts the 
subject viewpoint for evaluating the reasonableness of the 
explanation and does not include this language expressly, the 
commentary indicates that the limitation is "implicit in the 
Model Code formulation." Commentaries at 64-65. Thus, even if 
Utah had adopted the Model Code version of manslaughter in every 
aspect, the trial court's limitation excluding criminal acts as 
an explanation for defendant's disturbance would have been 
proper. 
This comment coincides with the following portion of 
the trial court's instruction 34: 
Such disturbance therefore cannot have been 
brought about by the defendant's own mental 
processes or by his intentional knowing or 
reckless acts. 
Instruction 34. The effect of the instruction is to limit the 
jury's consideration of defendant's "disturbance" to 
circumstances other than those created by his own wrongful 
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conduct. Theretore, even under the Model Penal Code view the 
instruction correctly eliminated the intentional, knowing or 
reckless acts of the defendant as a reasonable explanation for 
his alleged disturbance. 
Finally, defendant suggests that the instruction 
required the jury to find that defendants act of killing was 
reasonable before they could find him guilty of manslaughter. 
However, the instruction cannot reasonably be read to relate such 
a requirement. It made clear that the question was whetner the 
^extreme mental or emotional disturbance" was reasonable in light 
ot the circumstances, not whether the act ot killing was 
reasonable. In this sense, the instruction was consistent with 
the language of the manslaughter statute in place at the time of 
defendant's crimes and his trial. £££ Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-
205(1) (b) (1975) . 
Defendant argues that the trial court's Instruction 34 
improperly precludes the jury's consideration of a manslaughter 
theory of the case. But he fails to show just wnere the 
impropriety lies. Any alleged error as to the portion ot the 
instruction which requires that the disturbance be triggered by 
something external from defendant, even if erroneous, would be 
harmless. While the jury had sufficient external circumstances 
from which they could have reasonably found that defendant acted 
under an extreme mental or emotional disturbance if they had 
chosen to believe so, they convicted defendant of first degree 
murder after being instructed that they must first acquit 
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defendant of that offense before moving on to the consider the 
manslaughter charge. The result of the jury's deliberations 
would not likely have been different under these circumstances, 
even it defendant's proposed instruction had been given in place 
ot Instruction 34. Furthermore, defendant never alleged that his 
emotional disturbance was anything but a sudden reaction to his 
circumstances. He did not present evidence ot any long-standing 
disturbance that the jury could have been precluded from 
considering. 
POINT XII 
THE TRIAL COORT CORRECTLY INSTRDCTED THE JURY 
THAT BEFORE THEY CODLD CONSIDER DEFENDANT'S 
GDILT ON LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES, THEY MUST 
FIRST ACQUIT DEFENDANT OF FIRST DEGREE 
MURDER. 
Defendant's arguments on this point have no merit given 
this court's decision in Siaifi-Yx-ClsyiflDt 658 P.2d 624 (Utah 
198J) . In that case, the trial court instructed the jury that 
they must determine whether the defendant was guilty of the 
charged offense before they reviewed the elements of the lesser 
included offense. Ifl. at 627. Like defendant in the instant 
case, the defendant in GLayifiJQ appealed the instruction. This 
Court held: 
The courtfs instruction directed the jury to 
begin by determining whether the defendant 
was guilty of the charged offense. There was 
no error in this. 
Id. at 627. The trial court correctly exercised its privilege to 
instruct the Dury to first find whether defendant was guilty of 
first degree murder. 
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POINT XIII 
THE EVIDENCE OF FIRST-DEGREE MDRDER HAS 
SDFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE JORyS VERDICT 
Defendant urges the Court to reverse his conviction for 
first-degree murder claiming that the evidence was insufficient 
to establish either an intentional or knowing murder. He claims 
that the trial court should have granted his motion for a 
directed verdict of second-degree murder or manslaughter at the 
close of the State's case-in-chief and then hastens to argue that 
the evidence he presented in his defense supported the motion. 
While the trial court did not, of coursef have the benetit of 
defendant's evidence at the time of its ruling, it was correct to 
deny defendant's motion for a directed verdict, and, there was 
sufficient evidence presented during the entire trial to support 
the jury's verdict. 
The standard of review for a directed verdict is 
whether the State established a prima facie case against the 
defendant. Siaifi.Y^ -Smitl]r 675 P.2d 521, 524 (Utah 1983). It is 
unquestionable that the State presented evidence in this case 
that presented a jury question, and which required defendant to 
decide whether to proceed with evidence in his defense, id* 
It was clearly established that defendant shot Michael 
Burdell, tnat he did so in an attempt to escape lawful custody 
and that he did it with a gun received from a woman who met him 
in the courthouse foyer. From the testimony of Ed Seamons tnat 
defendant paused after aiming at Burdell and then fired at him, 
the jury could conclude that the murder was intentional or 
knowing. It is also significant that the gun defendant used 
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could not be fired without first cocking the hammer back. There 
was also the testimony of Richard Thomas that defendant seemed to 
"be all there" and that he obeyed Thomas' command to leave the 
area# from which the jury could conclude that defendant intended 
to kill and knew what he was doing when he shot Burdell. 
While defendant claimed he was contused and dazed from 
his own wound, Cathy Grotepas said that she heard the shots that 
were fired in the foyer and saw defendant afterward. Defendant 
did not appear wounded to her, he did not speak but stood in a 
crouched position ready to fire. Defendant continued to move 
around and to use his mental processes to effectuate his escape 
from the building. He took two separate hostages and forced them 
to help him flee. He threatened Wilburn Miller that he was 
"next." He shot Nick Kirk, an unarmed but uniformed man who 
suddenly appeared from the stairway. These are acts which the 
jury could well conclude were done with total awareness and 
intent. They are the acts of a man trying to escape custody at 
all costs and they were intentional acts. Thus, the State 
established a prima facie case and this Court should atfirm the 
trial court's denial of a directed verdict. 
At the close of all the evidence, there was evidence, 
including reasonable inferences, from which the jury could 
reasonably find all of the elements of the crime and this Court 
must, therefore, also sustain the jury's verdict. £Jta££_Y* 
McClaillf 706 P.2d 603, 605 (Utah 1985). Added to the evidence 
discussed above were defendant's admission at trial that he 
previously planned to escape and told an unidentified female to 
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do all of the things done by the woman in this case and that he 
walked to the drinking fountain to further his plan to escape* 
He admitted to Wayne Jorgenson that he remembered shooting 
Burdell because he thought Burdell might jump him. The jury was 
not required to believe defendant's testimony that he did not 
know what he was doing and did not remember shooting Burdell nor 
that he did not expect the woman to be there that day. Siaifi-S* 
J2££i£# 711 P.2d 232 (Utah 1985). Nor was it required to conclude 
that because defendant may have looked dazed or confused or 
helpless, he did not form the intent to kill Burdell. Sss £iai£ 
SU_UD£l£IBjQ2£l § 58 Utah Adv. Rep. 7 (May 21, 1987) (weighing 
evidence is exclusive function of jury) • The jury was free to 
weigh the evidence and determine whether defendant possessed the 
requisite mental state for first-degree murder and they 
determined that he did. Since there was evidence that supported 
this conclusion, this Court must affirm the jury's verdict. 
McClsiQf 706 P.2d at 603. 
POINT XIV 
THERE WAS NO PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDDCT IN 
EITHER PHASE OF THIS CASE. 
Defendant argues that the prosecutors in this case 
engaged in conduct and made remarks that amounted to 
prosecutorial misconduct and denied him a fair hearing at both 
the guilt and penalty phases of his trial. He urges the Court to 
reverse both his conviction and sentence for any one of the 
alleged instances of misconduct or for their cumulative effect. 
None of these instances were prosecutorial misconduct when gauged 
by the standard articulated by this Court and discussed below. 
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This Court has delineated when a prosecutor engages in 
misconduct: (1) when the prosecutor makes remarks that call to 
the jury's attention matters that they would not be justified in 
considering in determining their verdict, and (2) when the jurors 
were probably influenced by the improper remarks under the 
circumstances of the particular case. £Jtat£-Xx-&nfl£fiflSQn# 718 
P.2d 400, 402 (Utah 1986). 
The first instance defendant complains of here was the 
prosecutor's inadvertant reference to defendant as defendant 
Bishop when questioning one of the State's witnesses. While 
referring to a diagram the prosecutor stated "And then with the 
red, would you write the words "Defendant Bishop"—excuse m e — 
"Gardner." (R 2319). Defendant argues that this slip of the 
tongue caused the jury to compare defendant to Mr. Bishop and 
that, therefore, the jury considered matters outside the record. 
He asserts that the jury was probably influenced to believe that 
the State thought defendant's crime should be equated with that 
of, presumably, Arthur Gary Bishop. 
It stretches the imagination to entertain the thought 
that the jury could have used the prosecutor's slip in this 
manner. Contrary to defendant's assertion, this is 
distinguishable from the situation in £ia££_Yjt_l£2X# 688 P.2d 483 
(Utah 1984). In that case, the prosecutor in closing argument 
asked the jury to compare Troy to John Hinckley, the attempted 
assassin of the President of the United States. This is a far 
cry from the accidental use of someone else's name when referring 
to defendant for which the prosecutor corrected himself and then 
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moved on without further comment* Absolutely no use was made ot 
this slip in arguing the case to the jury and they most likely 
gave the error no second thoughts.9 
The second instance to which defendant refers occurred 
during the penalty phase when the prosecutors were laughing or 
smiling. The record on this issue is not entirely clear. During 
defendant's questioning of his brother, the following occurred: 
Q You knew that these photos existed 
because you knew he has been in and out ot 
jails and institutions all his life; isn't 
that correct? 
A Yes. 
Q You still love him, don't you? 
A Of course. 
Q Is he capable ot emotion? 
A Yes. 
Mr. Andrew Valdez: Your honor, I am 
going to object to this laughing when I 
question witnesses and the snickering on the 
part of the prosecution. I think that is 
unprofessional. 
The Court: You may proceed. 
Mr. Andrew Valdez: And I would like the 
record to retlect that they are doing that, 
and my client is on trial for his life. 
The Court: All right. That's enough 
argument. The record may so show. 
The Witness: It is nothing to laugh at. 
9
 In this context, it is interesting to note that defenaant 
wanted to present testimony in the penalty phase tnat would have 
asKed the jury to compare defenaant with Mr. Bishop (R. 2741)• 
This issue is briefed in Point XVI. Briefed in Point XVII is a 
collateral issue wherein defenaant requests this Court to compare 
his case with that of Mr. Bishop's. 
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(R. 2770-71) • Later, in chambers, the following occurred: 
We would also move for a dismissal. We 
feel that there was prosecutorial misconduct. 
During closing argument of Mr. Valdez in the 
guilt phase, the prosecution sat there and 
made faces at the jury, smiled and laughed at 
different things that the defense was 
saying... 
The Court: Well, Your motion is denied. 
Mr. Stott: May I have the benefit of the 
record? 
The Court: Yes. 
Mr. Stott: It was not during his 
argument that counsel was laughing. The 
other time that was brought up was brought 
about because counsel had gone over in front 
of the jury and removed the exhibits that we 
had placed in front of the jury, and Mr. Bown 
pointed that out to me and that was why Mr. 
Bown was smiling because of the little 
incident by counsel. 
The Court: That was the only time that 
the Court noticed it. Your motion is denied. 
(R. 2 891-92) . From the context ot the questioning and from the 
prosecutor's explanation it appears that they may not have been 
laughing at the testimony. However, from a written record it is 
difficult to know how much laughter there was or whether the jury 
was at all atfected by it. De-f-enaant could have made a better 
record by asking for an in camera discussion or by voir dire of 
the jury. In any event, the admonishment by the witness and 
defense counsel may also have influenced the jury so tnat they 
may have felt that the prosecutors were acting improperly and 
have been sufficiently chastened that they would not have been 
influenced by the prosecutors conduct even if they had 
interpreted it as being directed at the quality of the testimony 
being presented by defendant. 
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Defendant implies that the prosecutors continually 
laughed and made faces at the jury but the record does not 
support the implication. There was only one time that defense 
counsel made a record of laughing. There was no mention of faces 
until much later when counsel said that faces were made during 
closing argument. There was no record in closing argument tnat 
faces were being made or that anyone laughed. 
On the basis of this record, this Court can assume that 
Judge Banks was aware of the extent of the laughing, its context 
and its possible affect on the jury. Judge Banks did not 
consider the incident to be prosecutorial misconduct. In the 
absence of a clearer record, this Court should not reverse 
defendants conviction due to laughter by the prosecution during 
trial. 
Defendant's third complaint is that the prosecutor in 
closing argument said defendant had escaped from maximum 
security. Defendant claims that this statement was untrue and 
tnat the jury probably imposed the death penalty because they 
thought there was no prison that could contain defendant. 
Whether defendant had escaped from maximum security is a matter 
ot interpretation. In any event, this was a matter that the jury 
could properly consider and be intluenced by in determining the 
appropriate sentence for defendant. 
Defendant was housed in maximum security at the time he 
escaped in 1984 and 1985 (R. 1983, 2692-93, 2705). While 
defendant did not actually "go over the wall" he did escape 
custody when the opportunity arose. Both times by devising plans 
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to escape while outside the confines ot the maximum security unit 
on what appeared to be necessary excursions to the hospital and 
to court* Defendant chooses not to characterize this as an 
escape from maximum security even though the jury was clearly 
entitled to do so. 
Finally, defendant complains that the prosecutor, 
during closing argument, read from medical reports tnat were not 
admitted into evidence. What defendant fails to note is that, 
while the documents themselves were not introduced, the 
prosecutor and/or Dr. Heinbecker read those same passages aloud 
to the jury during cross-examination (compare R. 2 810, 2 811, 2 816 
to R. 2857-59). Thus, while the documents themselves were not 
in evidence, the evaluator's comments had already been read to 
the jury as comments that Dr. Heinbecker had either read in 
coming to his conclusions about defendant or was asked to compare 
to his conclusions. Moreover, all that the prosecutor attempted 
to do in closing argument was to point out perceived 
inconsistencies between Dr. Heinbecker1s conclusions and the 
records upon which those conclusions were drawn. This, the jury 
could properly consider, and there was no prosecutorial 
misconduct. 
x u
 Only one of the passages did not agree precisely with what 
came out in cross-examination. When reading from the John Gill 
report in closing argument, the prosecutor read two more 
introductory sentences than he read to Dr. Heinbecker (compare R. 
2 85 8 with R. 2 816). These sentences do not add appreciably to 
the evidence brought out on cross-examination and were not 
sufficient to result in prosecutorial misconduct. 
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Even if one or more of the incidents in this case were 
somewhat improper, proof of defendant's guilt was strong and the 
evidence justifying the death penalty weighty. There was 
substantial independent evidence from which the jury could have 
concluded that defendant committed first-degree murder and that 
death was the appropriate penalty. Under these circumstances, 
defendant's conviction and death sentence should be affirmed. 
&n3l£3S2IW 718 P.2d at 403. 
POIHT XV 
EVIDENCE OP THE CHEERS TAVERN If ORDER 
CONVICTION WAS PROPERLY ADMITTED AT THE 
PENALTY PHASE AS EVIDENCE OF AGGRAVATION. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-207 (Supp. 1987) (last amended 1982) 
provides, in part: 
(2) • . . evidence may be presented [at the 
penalty hearing] as to any matter the court 
deems relevant to sentence, including but not 
limited to the nature and circumstances of 
the crime, the defendant's character, 
background, history, mental and physical 
condition, and any other facts in aggravation 
or mitigation of the penalty . . . 
Aggravating circumstances shall include those 
as outlined in 76-5-202. . . • 
Defendant contends that evidence ot a murder he committed at the 
Cheers Tavern on October 8 or 9, 19 84 should not have been 
admitted in his penalty hearing because he was not convicted ot 
the murder until June 28, 1985, a little over 2 months after he 
killed Michael Burdell. He bases this claim on the last sentence 
quoted above which states that aggravating circumstances include 
those outlined in § 76-5-202. On the theory that only those 
statutory circumstances may be presented in aggravation, and § 
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76-5-202(h) states that the defendant was previously convicted of 
murder when he committed the murder for which he is being tried, 
defendant asserts that he was not previously convicted of the 
Cheers Tavern murder. Defendant's argument fails for several 
reasons. 
First, defendant has raised this issue for the first 
time on appeal* Not only did he not object to the testimony 
about the Cheers murder, he stated that he had no objection when 
the State offered testimony and the certified copy of the 
judgment of conviction (R. 2725) • While the State recognizes 
that this Court will review a capital case for manifest and 
prejudicial error even though no proper objection was made at 
trial, 5£a±£_2.i_iteJ:fcflnr 675 P.2d 577, 581 (Utah 1983) in this 
case defendant acquiesced to admission of the evidence. This 
Court discussed in ££a££-XA«Mfi5liDat 56 Utah Adv. Rep. 17 (April 
23, 1987) the difference between waiver occasioned by a failure 
to object and that caused by counsel's affirmative representation 
that defendant had no objection. Here as in Medina* counsel 
affirmatively led the trial court to believe that there was 
nothing wrong. Under these circumstances, even though this is a 
capital case, the State requests the Court to decline review of 
this alleged error. 
Second, the alleged error was not manifest and 
prejudicial nor was it error at all. Section 76-3-207(2) allows 
evidence in aggravation beyond the statutory factors required for 
proof of first-degree murder. It does not make sense, when the 
language of that section is read together, to find that the 
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Legislature limited the State to presenting at the penalty phase 
only the evidence that was admitted at trial by citing to § 76-5-
202. Such a restrictive reading renders most of that section 
meaningless. 
Third, as Justice Stevens said in fi3I£lSX_.5U_ElflLi£ia, 
463 U.S. 940, 967 (1983) (Stevens, J., joined by Powell, J., 
concurring in the judgment): 
[T]he Constitution does not prohibit 
consideration at the sentencing phase of 
information not directly related to either 
statutory aggravating [circumstances] or 
statutory mitigating factors as long as that 
information is relevant to the character of 
the defendant or the circumstances ot the 
crime. 
And S££ Z3Q£_yx_jgjt£gl]jgQS, 462 U.S. 862 (1982) . Here, the Cheers 
Tavern murder was re levant to the v i o l e n t nature of defendant's 
character and h i s l i k e l i h o o d to continue to commit v i o l e n t 
crimes. 
Defendant insists that this conviction was not relevant 
because it did not show that he was undeterred by prior brushes 
with the law since he was not convicted and punished for that 
murder prior to committing this murder. The evidence did show, 
however, that defendant was not deterred in committing the Cheers 
Tavern murder even though he had been previously imprisoned for 
violent crimes and was, in fact, on escape from custody at the 
time he committed the Cheers murder. The jury could infer from 
that evidence that defendant would probably continue to be 
undeterred from committing violent crimes if he were punished by 
imprisonment on this conviction. 
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Moreover, EefiBlfi^JU-Baldfiias, 41 Cal.3d 14 4, 222 Cal. 
Rptr. 184, 711 P.2d 480 (1985) does not support defendant's 
content ion . The EjBldsias court was faced with a s t a t u t e which 
precluded use of prior non-v io lent felony conv ic t ions which the 
court interpreted to mean conv ic t ions that occurred prior to 
Commission ot the offense under cons iderat ion . The s t a t u t e slid 
allow for introduction ot v i o l e n t crimes without regard to time 
or whether defendant had been conv ic ted . 711 P.2d at 514. Thus, 
the c o u r t ' s dec i s ion was based on a s tatutory in terpreta t ion 
where the Legis lature had made a c lear d i s t i n c t i o n between the 
types of crimes in quest ion by s ta t ing that l e s s e r crimes 
required a prior c o n v i c t i o n . Violent crimes, such as the one 
introduced here , would be admissible under the Cal i fornia scheme 
even without a c o n v i c t i o n . 
F i n a l l y , the F i f th Circui t Court recent ly held in 
Hilli3IDS-SjL-LyDaU3llf 814 F.2d 205, 207-208 (5th Cir . 1987) , that 
evidence at the punishment phase ot unadjudicated crimes does not 
v i o l a t e the eighth and fourteenth amendments of the United States 
Cons t i tu t ion . The court noted that i t had previously rejected 
the same argument under the F i f t h , S ix th , Eighth and Fourteenth 
amendments in MilifiQ^y^Eificiiaifij:' 7 4 4 F # 2 d 1 0 9 l # 109J, 1097 (5th 
Cir . 1984) , £ s r £ . denied , 471 U.S. 1030 (1985) , concluding that 
the Texas procedure which allowed evidence ot unadjudicated 
crimes in the penalty phase did not undermine the 
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y mandated procedures s e t forth in slui£K_2.i,-Tej&a5 # 
428 U.S. 262 (1976) and StfiSS-S^SefltSiS# 428 U.S. 153 (1976) . 
The court went on to say that s o c i e t y ' s reservat ions about the 
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use ot wrongdoing other than that for which a defendant was being 
tr i ed "are addressed by properly applied standards of relevance 
and s u f f i c i e n c y ot proot ." MilifiDr 7 44 F.2d at 1097. 
Thus, even i f t h i s Court agreed with defendant that .S 
76-3-207 precluded use ot the Cheers Tavern murder, it should 
tind that there was no manifest and prejudicial effect from 
admitting the evidence. There is no constitutional prohibition 
against admitting the evidence, especially where defendant had 
been convicted ot the crime prior to trial of this case. 
POINT XVI 
THE TRIM. COURT PROPERLY EXCLUDED AFFIDAVITS 
OUTLINING THE FACTS OF OTHER CAPITAL CASES 
AND TESTIMONY FROM ASSOCIATES OF THE VICTIM 
IN THE PENALTY PHASE 
A. AFFIDAVITS DESCRIBING CAPITAL CASES. 
Defendant wanted to present to the jury at penalty 
phase atfidavits from defense attorneys and prosecutors 
summarizing the facts of capital cases they had tried along with 
the aggravating and mitigating circumstances upon which the 
juries were instructed. He insists that these artidavits were 
relevant to the nature ot defendant's crime and that they were, 
theretore, admissible under Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-207 (Supp. 
1982)• On appeal, defendant claims that Judge BanKs abused his 
discretion by retusing to admit the aftidavits. 
The primary concern in a capital case is that the 
decision to impose the death penalty "was fairly made in the 
context ot the circumstances ot Itbs_3ef£D£l<ani 1 and [jjifi] 
crimes." AnflLSHS-Y.* JBSiliS r 677 P.2d 81, 93 (Utah 1983) 
(emphasis added). Defendant's argument that the jury should have 
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been allowed to consider the sentences ot others i s nothing more 
than one for approval of the type of case-by-case comparison 
re jec ted by t h i s Court in &ndl£aS_E*_M££j;i£ r 607 P. 2d 816, 82 5 
(Utah 1980)
 f £ £ £ i . flfiDifidf 449 U.S. 891, and again in £ndr,£BS_X.i, 
MQJLliSr 677 P.2d at 97-98. The only d i f ference here i s that 
defendant asks the Jury to engage in case-by-case comparison 
instead of the j u d i c i a r y . There i s no compelling reason to allow 
the jury to engage in the sor t of comparative review t h i s Court 
has re jected as inappropriate for i t s e l f . 
Defendant does not a s s e r t that such review i s 
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y mandated, and r i g h t l y s o . I t i s w e l l - s e t t l e d 
that case-by-case proport ional i ty review i s not required by the 
Federal Cons t i tu t ion . £ullfiy_yx_Sj9IIiS# 465 U.S. 37 , 43 (1984) . 
Given the holding of the two £n3££HS_XjL_£}flI£iS, c a s e s , 
comparative proport ional i ty review i s not required under the Utah 
Const i tut ion e i t h e r . Consequently, i t was not an abuse of 
d i s c r e t i o n for the judge to exclude the evidence from the j u r y ' s 
penalty d e l i b e r a t i o n s . 
Defendant, however, i n s i s t s that the evidence was 
re levant to the nature of h i s crime. What defendant ignores i s 
that § 76-3-207 does not s t a t e that the jury should consider the 
nature of h i s crime in comparison to the crimes ot others but 
rerers only to the circumstances of the part icu lar defendant's 
c a s e . This Court should not accept defendant's i n v i t a t i o n to 
engage in j u d i c i a l l e g i s l a t i o n by adding a case-by-case 
comparison to § 76-3-207 that i s not Cons t i tu t iona l ly mandated 
and which the Leg i s la ture did not s p e c i f i c a l l y provide . 
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Defendant cites language from slUISJS-XjL-Ifisas, 42 8 U.S. 
262, 276 (1976)
 f "that the jury must have before it all possible 
relevant information about the individual defendant whose fate 
it must determine" in support of his claim. Information about 
other defendant's and their crimes is not information about the 
defendant whose fate is at issue. Neither this case nor £acLiH3S 
Jljt.QJslsllfinLS, 455 U.S. 104 (1982) , support defendant's contention. 
In Savings, the information that was excluded was the defendant's 
family history not a comparative analysis of other murder cases. 
Finally, as the prosecutor pointed out, defendant's 
affidavits only presented the statutory aggravating and 
mitigating factors upon which the juries were instructed (R. 
2750-51) • From these facts, the jury in this case could not have 
been able to discern what aggravation and mitigation the juries 
££UQd in those other cases. Had the trial court admitted 
defendant's affidavits, the State would, no doubt, have submitted 
opposing affidavits in those cases and probably would have chosen 
a few cases on which defendant did not present information. The 
defendant would then have wanted to submit opposing affidavits. 
Thus, contrary to defendant's assurances, the penalty phase of 
this trial would have turned into a forum for challenging the 
penalties imposed in other cases and for re-litigating those 
cases and in the end for challenging the appropriateness of 
capital punishment in general. This Court has rejected such 
attempts in the past. £±ai£_YAJS£i:t£Qr 675 P.2d 57 7, 588 (Utah 
1983). 
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B. TESTIMuNY OP VICTIM'S ASSOCIATES. 
Defendant also wished to call Kay Henry, a friend of 
Michael Burdell, as a witness at the penalty hearing to testify 
that Mr. Burdell would not want defendant to be sentenced to 
death and that she did not want that either (R. 27 33)• He also 
asserts on appeal that he wanted to call Robert Macri to testify 
on that issue, however, he did not proffer Mr. Macri's testimony 
nor name him to the trial court (R. 2738). The court stated tnat 
it was only ruling on Ms. Henry and would consider the other 
witnesses as defendant proffered them (Id«). Since the trial 
court was not given an opportunity to rule on Mr. Maori's 
testimony, this Court should not consider defendant's claim as to 
Mr. Macri, but only his claim as to Ms. Henry. A££2Ldr i§£ai£_Y* 
£JL£S2SJL1/ 660 P.2d 252 (Utah 1983) (this Court will not consider 
issues raised for the first time on appeal)• 
Defense counsel characterized Ms. Henry's testimony 
this way: 
Yes, Your honor, we intended to call Kay 
Henry and possibly other associates and 
religious colleagues of Mike Burdell. They 
indicated to us a desire to come in and 
testify, that in their belief they do not 
think that Mike Burdell would want Ronnie 
Gardner to get the death penalty, and they 
certainly do not want Ronnie Gardner to get 
the death penalty. 
(R. 2733) • From this proffer, the trial court could properly 
determine that the witness was going to testify about her own and 
Mr. Burdell's religious philosophy about the death penalty. This 
evidence was not mitigation ot djefendaniJLa crime, but went to the 
appropriateness of the death penalty in general. This Court has 
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previous ly disapproved such test imony. £££ £ia££_X*JBi2L±2Qr 6 75 
P.2d 577, 588 (Utah 1983) CJJtAQS EianJaiD-Yx-Staifi# 245 Ga. 141, 
263 S.E.2d 666, 673 (1980) , ££JLfc. d e n i e d 447 U.S. 930 (1980) 
(court properly excluded defendant's proffered testimony on 
r e l i g i o u s and phi losophica l approaches to the death p e n a l t y ) . 
The United States Supreme Court cases c i t e d by 
defendant, L2£jjeii_Y.*_GliiQ, 438 U.S. 586 (1978); EdgingS-i* 
flKlah2fll3# 455 U.S. 104 (1982); and SJsiBPfil-y^SQUih-CarfiliDSf 476 
U.S. , 106 S. Ct. 1669 (1986) , while they may support the 
general propos i t ion that mit igat ion should be allowed, do not 
require that the type of evidence defendant wanted to present be 
al lowed. SJsiEPfit held that evidence of a defendant's 
adaptabi l i ty to prison l i f e should be allowed. E&iiQSS allowed 
in evidence of defendant's turbulent family h i s tory and emotional 
problems. LfisJSfiii discussed the defendant's character and record 
and mit igat ing circumstances of the offense i t s e l f . These types 
of evidence are not at a l l what defendant proposed to put on 
through Ms. Henry. 
Moreover, s ince Mr. Burdell could not speak for 
himself , i t i s impossible to determine whether he would have 
agreed with the proffered a s ser t ion that he would not have wanted 
defendant to be sentenced to death. Ms. Henry's statements in 
that regard would have been pure specu la t ion . 
Final ly^ while some s t a t e s may allow v ic t ims or 
v i c t ims• fami l i e s to p lea for the death pena l ty , that was not 
done in t h i s c a s e . Thus, the proffered testimony was not 
necessary to counterbalance such t a c t i c s . And, in fact# the 
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Supreme Court rejected the use of such p leas for a death sentence 
in fi2J2£]3_YA-.l£flIXland, 55 U.S. Law Week 4 836 (decided June 15 f 
1987) . 
In fi£fl£]j, the Court found evidence of the personal 
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of v ic t ims and the impact of crimes on v i c t ims 1 
f a m i l i e s was i rre l evant to the defendant's "personal 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y and moral g u i l t . " 55 U.S. Law Week a t 4837 
S112±JLIig JSDffiUQ -^Ya-EJLfiLida r 458 U.S. 7 82, 801 (1982) . The 
cnaracter of the v ic t im and h i s death's impact on h i s family are 
wholly unrelated to the blameworthiness of a part icu lar 
defendant, e s p e c i a l l y where the defendant did not know h i s v ic t im 
and defendants rarely s e l e c t the ir v ic t ims based upon the e f f e c t 
i t may have on o t h e r s . 1 3 . at 4 838. As the Court further 
explained, the degree to which a family [or c lo se acquaintances] 
are able to express the ir gr ie f i s not re levant to whether a 
defendant may merit the death penal ty . Id« A f a i r opportunity to 
rebut t h i s evidence would s h i f t the j u r y ' s focus away from the 
defendant in a s i t u a t i o n requiring an indiv idual ized sentencing 
dec i s ion based upon the character of the defendant and the nature 
o£ the crime, not i t s v i c t i m s . 
The same ra t iona le supports the exc lus ion of the type 
o£ evidence defendant proposed here . This evidence r e a l l y went 
to the character of the v i c t im — his b e l i e f s about the death 
penalty and perhaps h i s capacity for forg iveness — rather than 
the nature of defendant9s crime or defendant's background or 
character . Since the jury must base i t s dec i s ion upon 
defendant's c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s and not tnose ot the v i c t i m , the 
t r i a l court properly excluded Ms. Henry's test imony. 
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POIHT XVII 
THIS COURT IS NOT REQUIRED TO FIND THAT THE 
DEATH PENALTY IN THIS CASE IS PROPORTIONATE 
WITH OTHER DEATH PENALTY CASES. 
In Point XVII ot defendant's brief (App. Br. at pp. 
134-147) he argues tnat his death sentence should be reversed 
because it is an excessive penalty when compared to sentences 
imposed in other Utah capital cases. Specifically, defendant 
argues that the Utah legislature has provided for comparative 
proportionality review and that the defendant's death sentence 
must be regarded as disproportionate to his crime when compared 
to other capital homicide cases in Utah. 
Defendant correctly states that the Eighth Amendment of 
the United States Constitution does not require a state appellate 
court to compare a death sentence with penalties imposed in 
similar cases before it affirms a death sentence. Pulleys* 
flailiS* 465 U.S. 43 (1984). Defendant then argues that although 
Eull£¥ does not require comparative proportionality review, the 
Court in Pulley fails to explain how an appellate court can 
determine whether the death penalty has been imposed 
"discriminatorily" unless it examines other cases. 
In Pulley* petitioner claimed on appeal that the 
California capital punishment statute was unconstitutional 
because it failed to require the California Supreme Court to 
compare petitioner's sentence with the sentences imposed in 
similar capital cases to determine whether they were 
proportionate. 
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In addressing p e t i t i o n e r ' s claim the EullfiX Court 
addressed the concern expressed in fiiimdD-Yx-Sfifltaii# 408 D.S. 
238 (1972) 1 1 tha t the death penalty not be imposed in an 
a r b i t r a r y or capricious manner. The Court also discussed various 
s t a t u t e s redra t ted as a r e s u l t of the decision in EUIIS3Q-Yx 
&£fi£9id* After fuiman two-thirds of the Sta tes redrafted the i r 
c ap i t a l sentencing s t a t u t e s in an e t f o r t to l i m i t jury 
d i s c r e t i o n . Many s t a t u t e s now require the reviewing court to 
determine whether the sentence i s d ispropor t ionate to tha t 
imposed in similar cases . Some States require p ropor t iona l i ty 
review not by s t a t u t e , but by case law. In other Sta tes the 
appel la te court does not perform a propor t ional i ty review a t a l l . 
The United Sta tes Supreme Court has upheld each type of s t a t u t e . 
EulaL£y# 465 U.S. a t 44. The s t a t u t e s requir ing comparative 
propor t iona l i ty review should be considered as an addi t ional 
safeguard against a rb i t r a ry or capricious sentencing. Pulley# 
465 U.S. a t 45. 
Needless to say, that some schemes 
providing proportionality review are 
constitutional does not mean that such review 
is indispensable. We take statutes as we 
find them. To endorse the statute as a whole 
is not to say that anything different is 
unacceptable. As we said in Qxega "[wle do 
not intend to suggest that only the above-
described procedures would be permissible 
under Fuxmaa or that any sentencing system 
constructed along these general lines would 
inevitably satisfy the concerns of Fmnjan for 
each distinct system must be examined on an 
__iD£UYld]J3l basis." 
1 1
 In £ntlB3D the Court declared that capital punishment 
administered under statutes vesting unguided sentencing 
discretion in juries and trial judges was unconstitutionally 
cruel and unusual punishment. 
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•[T]he concerns expressed in Euoan ••• can 
be met by a carefully drafted statute tnat 
ensures that the sentencing authority is 
given adequate information and guidance. As 
a general proposition these concerns are best 
met by a system that provides for a 
bifurcated proceeding at which the sentencing 
authority is apprised of the information 
relevant to the imposition of sentence and 
provided with standards to guide its use of 
the information." 
EilllfiXr 456 U. S. a t 4 5 , 46 c i t i n g t o S lS2g_2*_S£3ls i .3# 428 U.S . 
1 5 3 , 195 (1976) . 
In compl iance w i th JL]1LB3B-1LJL-Q£QL9L£ * t h i s Court has 
determined t h a t i t has the duty "to determine whether the 
s e n t e n c e of death r e s u l t e d from e r r o r , p r e j u d i c e or 
a r b i t r a r i n e s s , or was d i s p r o p o r t i o n a t e . " ££ai£_JZ*.J3Q<2d§ 648 P.2d 
71 (Utah 1982) £ £ £ i . den ied* 459 U.S . 988 ( 1 9 8 2 ) . In de termin ing 
whether the death s e n t e n c e i s p r o p o r t i o n a t e "the s e n t e n c i n g body 
must f o c u s on t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s of the crime as w e l l as t h e 
background and p e r s o n a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of the d e f e n d a n t . " Hfifid, 
64 8 P.2d a t 7 7 . $££ 3l£J2 S5££lJ3y_ix-Elfit i f la * 46 3 U.S . 93 9 
(1983) . 
Defendant c l a i m s t h a t the C o u r t ' s d e c i s i o n in S i a i f i - i * 
ElSLLSi 572 P.2d 1338 (Utah 1977) " l e a v e s open t h e q u e s t i o n of 
whether t h i s Court w i l l employ the d e v i c e of c a s e - b y - c a s e 
comparison" (App. Br. at 137). However, defendant ignores this 
Courfs statement in AndlSHS_X*-,ite£IiSt 607 P.2d 816 (Utah 1980), 
fifili. denied 449 U.S. 891 (1980): 
Every criminal defendant sentenced to death 
could . . . attacK the statute as applied by 
alleging that more convicted murderers, 
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equally or more deserving to die, had been 
spared, and thus that the death penalty was 
being applied arbitrarily and capriciously, 
as evidenced by his own case. The federal 
courts then would be compelled continuously 
to question every substantive decision with 
regard to the imposition of the death 
penalty. • • • 
[I]n order to review properly those 
determinations, a careful examination of 
every trial record would be in order. 
A thorough review would necessitate looking 
behind the decisions of jurors and 
prosecutors, as well. Additionally, 
unsuccessful litigants could, before their 
sentences were carried out, challenge their 
sentences again and again as each later-
convicted murder was given life imprisonment, 
because the circumstances of each additional 
defendant so sentenced would become 
additional factors to be considered. The 
process would be never-ending and the 
benchmark for comparison would be chronically 
undefined. • • • 
(citations omitted) 607 P.2d at 825. 
Defendant also claims that Utah Code Ann. § 76-1 
(197 8) provides for appellate case comparison (Br. of App. 
137). Section 76-1-104 provides: 
The provisions of this code shall be 
construed in accordance with these general 
purposes. 
(1) Forbid and prevent the commission of 
offenses; 
(2) Define adequately the conduct and 
mental state which constitute each offense 
and safeguard conduct that is without fault 
from condemnation as criminal. 
(3) Prescribe penalties which are 
proportionate to the seriousness of offenses 
and which permit recognition or differences 
in rehabilitation possibilities among 
individual offenders. 
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(4) Prevent arbitrary or oppressive 
treatment ot persons accused or convicted of 
offenses. 
While defendant's argument may be a plausible one# it 
is without merit in light ot this Court's decisions in ££a££_.5Zx 
Hflfid and &n3££HS-.XjL_Mfl£.E.is. If this Court desired to interpret § 
76-1-104 as providing for a proportionality comparison of all 
capital cases before a death sentence could be affirmedf this 
Court had the opportunity to do so in H22& and £nd££HS* Instead, 
this Court has determined that a death sentence must be 
proportionate with the otfense and the sentencing body must look 
not at other death penalty cases but at the circumstances of this 
particular crime and the background and personal characteristics 
of the defendant. Wgadf 648 P.2d at 77. 
Finally, defendant argues that his death sentence must 
be regarded as disproportionate to his crime when his case is 
compared to other capital homicide cases in Utah (App. Br. at 
142)• Because this Court has rejected a case-by-case comparison 
in All£££BS_Y*_Mfi££i£ f 607 P.2d 816, 825 (Utah 1980), £££i. 
$2£Di££l# 449 U.S. 891 (1980) and again in &n3££WS_X.*_MQ££i£, 677 
P.2d 81, 97-98 (1983), it is not necessary for this Court to 
address this argument. 
Moreover, defendant's suggestion that because his crime 
cannot be equated with those committed in £ia££_YjL_Pi££££# 572 
P.2d 1338 (Utah 1977) £££*. 3£Dl£d# 439 U.S. 882 (1978), £ia±£-JU 
£JL2b2B# Case No. 19907, or ££a££_Y^-£fiD_Jj3£f££Jtyf Case No. 2 07 40 
that his death sentence is disproportionate is without merit. 
This Court did not hold in the £ifi£££ opinion, nor has it held in 
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any of its subsequent decisions in capital cases# that a 
"shooting must rise to the level of an extreme/ unusually serious 
or shocking crime" or that a defendant must "torture" a victim or 
that a defendant must commit "multiple killings" before a death 
sentence is appropriate (£££ Br. of App. at 142-43) • Rather, the 
primary concern is that the decision to impose the death penalty 
"was fairly made in the context of the circumstances of [the 
defendant] and [his] crime." AndtSBS-iU-EJSIliS# 677 P.2d at 93. 
There is nothing to indicate that the standard 
necessary to implement the death penalty was not met in 
defendant's case. The jury in the instant case had before it the 
following evidence: defendant intentionally shot two persons in 
an escape attempt; defendant had a substantial prior criminal 
record which included a number of violent acts and previous 
escapes; and defendant presented little mitigating evidence. 
Based upon this evidence the jury found beyond a reasonable doubt 
that total aggravation outweighed total mitigation/ and was also 
persuaded/ beyond a reasonable doubt/ that the imposition of the 
death penalty was justified and appropriate in the circumstances. 
Sfifi Additional instructions (R. 612/ Appendix B); HQfid/ 648 P.2d 
83. 
In Hfifldi the Court stated: 
These standards require that the sentencing 
body compare the totality of the mitigating 
against the totality of the aggravating 
factors/ not in terms ot the relative numbers 
ot the aggravating and the mitigating 
factors/ but in terms of their respective 
substantiality and persuasiveness. 
Basically/ what the sentencing authority must 
decide is how compelling or persuasive the 
totality of the mitigating factors are when 
-83-
compared against the totality of the 
aggravating factors. The sentencing body, in 
making the judgment that aggravating factors 
"outweigh," or are more compelling thanf the 
mitigating factorsf must have no reasonable 
doubt as to that conclusion, and as to the 
additional conclusion that the death penalty 
is justified and appropriate after 
considering all the circumstances. This 
means that upon consideration of all of the 
circumstances relating to this defendant and 
this crime the sentencing authority must be 
convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
death penalty should be imposed. 
648 P.2d at 83-84. Because the most stringent burden of 
persuasion as required by Haad was applied in this case, on 
review this Court should give the jury's verdict in penalty phase 
even greater deference than it may have given those verdicts in 
past capital cases where there was no well defined burden of 
persuasion in place. Unless the death sentence is clearly 
disproportionate in a given case, the jury's decision to impose 
that penalty should be upheld. As noted in £n3l£tt£_Y*-MflJ:j:i£r 
677 P.2d 81 (Utah 1983) : 
There exists . . . a critical distinction 
between the reasonable doubt standard in 
guilt-innocence determinations and the degree 
of certitude standard in the penalty phase of 
a capital trial. The issue in petitioners' 
case was not whether the decision to impose 
the death penalty was accurate, but rather 
whether it was fairly made in the context of 
the circumstances of petitioners and their 
crimes. No measure of "accuracy" exists 
whereby that decision can be analyzed in the 
same way as the decision about whether a tact 
is true or false. "[Slentencing decisions 
rest on a far-reaching inquiry into countless 
facts and circumstances and not on the type 
of proof of particular elements that 
returning a conviction does." 
(citations omitted) 677 P.2d at 93. 
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Given the facts of this case and defendant's prior 
criminal record, it cannot be said that the circumstances in this 
case were so unpersuasive or uncompelling that no reasonable jury 
could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that total aggravation 
outweighed total mitigation and that the death penalty was 
appropriate. 
POINT XVIII 
DEFENDANT IS NOT ENTITLED TO REVERSAL OF ANY 
OF HIS CONVICTIONS ON A THEORY OF CUMULATIVE 
ERROR. 
Defendant r e q u e s t s t h a t t h i s Court r e v e r s e h i s 
c o n v i c t i o n on the b a s i s of e i t h e r i n d i v i d u a l l y p r e j u d i c i a l or 
c u m u l a t i v e error* Based upon t h e f o r e g o i n g d i s c u s s i o n of 
d e f e n d a n t ' s a l l e g a t i o n s of e r r o r , r e v e r s a l of h i s c o n v i c t i o n i s 
n o t warranted on the b a s i s of any i n d i v i d u a l error or on a theory 
of cumula t ive e r r o r . Because the t r i a l c o u r t , a t most , committed 
harmless e r r o r , d e f e n d a n t ' s c o n v i c t i o n should be aff irmed* j=i££ 
H£UiS£S_£i-£±d±£* 644 P.2d 1 1 1 , 113 (Okl. Cr. 1 9 8 2 ) ; Siatf i -X* 
McKSDZiS/ 608 P.2d 4 2 8 , 448 (Mont. 1 9 8 0 ) , S£I±* dsaiSd# 449 U.S . 
1050; flni££d_S£atSS_2A-Bfilu:# 581 F.2d 1 2 9 4 , 1304 (8th C i r . 1 9 7 8 ) , 
CfiJLfc* £l£Di£3r 439 U.S . 958 . 
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Based upon the foregoing arguments, defendant's 
convictions and sentences should be affirmed. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this _/£$ day of July, 19 87 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
'SANDRA LC^SJOGREN 
Assistant Attorney General 
KIMBERLY K. HORNAK 
Assistant Attorney General 
I hereby certify that on the I^JUL. day of July, 19 87, I 
caused to be mailed, postage prepaid, four (4) true and exact 
copies of the above and foregoing Brief of Respondent to Joan C. 
Watt, Esq., Andrew A. Valdez, Esq., and James A. Valdez, Esq., at 





76-3*207. Capita] felony — Sentencing proceeding. 
(1) When a defendant has pled guilty to or been found guilty of a capital 
felony, there shall be further proceedings before the court or jury on the issue 
of sentence. In the case of a plea of guilty to a capital felony, the sentencing 
proceedings shall be conducted by the court which accepted the plea or by a 
jury upon request of the defendant. When a defendant has been found guilty of 
a capital felony, the proceedings shall be conducted before the court or jury 
which found the defendant guilty, provided the defendant may waive hearing 
before the jury, in which event the hearing shall be before the court. If, how-
ever, circumstances make it impossible or impractical to reconvene the same 
jury for the sentencing proceedings the court may dismiss that jury and con-
vene a new jury for such proceedings. If a retrial of the sentencing proceedings 
is necessary as a consequence of a remand from an appellate court, the sen-
tencing authority shall be determined as provided in subsection (4) below. 
(2) In these sentencing proceedings, evidence may be presented as to any 
matter the court deems relevant to sentence, including but not limited to the 
nature and circumstances of the crime, the defendant's character, back-
ground, history, mental and physical condition, and any other facts in aggra-
vation or mitigation of the penalty. Any evidence the court deems to have 
probative force may be received regardless of its admissibility under the ex-
clusionary rules of evidence. The state's attorney and the defendant shall be 
permitted to present argument for or against sentence of death. Aggravating 
circumstances shall include those as outlined in 76-5-202. Mitigating circum-
stances shall include the following: 
(a) The defendant has no significant history of prior criminal activity; 
(b) The murder was committed while the defendant was under the 
influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance; 
(c) The defendant acted under extreme duress or under the substantial 
domination of another person; 
(d) At the time of the murder, the capacity of the defendant to appreci-
ate the criminality (wrongfulness) of his conduct or to conform his con-
duct to the requirement of law was substantially impaired as a result of 
mental disease, intoxication, or influence of drugs; 
(e) The youth of the defendant at the time of the crime; 
(f) The defendant was an accomplice in the murder committed by an-
other person and his participation was relatively minor; 
(g) And any other bet in mitigation of the penalty. 
(3) The court or jury, as the case may be, shall retire to consider the pen-
alty. In all proceedings before a jury, under this section, it shall be instructed 
as to the punishment to be imposed upon a unanimous verdict for death and 
that to be imposed if a unanimous verdict for death is not found If the jury 
reports unanimous agreement to impose the sentence of death, the court shall 
discharge the jury and shall impose the sentence of death. If the jury is unable 
to reach a unanimous verdict imposing the sentence of death, the court shall 
discharge the jury *nd impose the sentence of life imprisonment. 
(4) Upon any appeal by the defendant where the sentence is of death, the 
appellate court, if it finds prejudicial error in the sentencing proceeding only, 
may aet aside the sentence of death and remand the case to the trial court for 
new sentencing proceedings to the extent necessary to correct the error or 
trrors. No error in the sentencing proceedings shall result in the reversal of 
the conviction of a capital felony. In cases of remand for new sentencing 
proceedings, all exhibits and a transcript of all testimony and other evidence 
properly admitted in the prior trial and sentencing proceedings shall be ad-
missible in the new sentencing proceedings, and: 
(a) If the sentencing proceeding was before a jury a Dew jury shall be 
impaneled for the new sentencing proceeding; 
(b) If the sentencing proceeding was before a judge, the original trial 
judge shall conduct the new sentencing proceeding; or 
(c) If the sentencing proceeding was before a judge and the original 
trial judge is unable or unavailable to conduct a new sentencing proceed-
ing, then another judge shall be designsted to conduct the new sentencing 
proceeding. 
(5) In the event the desth penalty is held to be unconstitutional by the 
Utah supreme court or the United States supreme court, the court having 
jurisdiction over a person previously sentenced to desth for a capital felony 
ahall cause such person to be brought before the court, and the court shall 
sentence the person to life imprisonment, and any person who is thereafter 
convicted of a capital felony ahall be sentenced to life imprisonment. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
VS. 
RONNIE LEE GARDNER, 
Defendant. 
ADDITIONAL INSTRUCTIONS 
CRIMINAL NO. CR 85-700 
Members of the Jury: 
Having found the defendant guilty of Criminal Homicide, 
Murder in the First Degree, which is a capital offense, you 
now, under the law, have a responsibility with respect to 
the circumstances of the crime: 
The law provides that when a defendant has been found 
guilty of a capital offense there shall be a further proceeding 
on the issue of penalty. The penalty to be imposed, as provided 
by law, is either death or life imprisonment. 
You are further instructed that the instructions previously 
given to you in the guilt phase of the trial are to apply 
in the penalty phase, where applicable. 
In this proceeding, prejudice arbitrary actions or capri-
ciousness should not enter into your deliberations. 
You have previously found the defendant guilty of Murder 
in the First Degree in this case. It is therefore improper 
V*' v- Is %* 
for you to again debate or reconsider the question of defendant's 
guilt or innocence of that offense. 
The deliberations in the sentencing phase are significantly 
different from those you were engaged in in the guilt phase. 
In the sentencing phase you will need to n.nn^iA^f mnrp fh*n 
the defendant's particular »n+V You must take into consideration 
the particulars of the offense with the character and propensities 
of the offender, together with other factors as hereinafter 
outlined for you. 
The law provides that evidence may be presented to you 
as to any matter the court deems relevant to the sentence, 
including but not limited to the nature and circumstances 
of.—t-he cxJtinej the defendant's character, background, h i s t o r y , 
mental and physical condition, and any other facts in aggrava-
tion or mitigation of the penalty. The State's attorneys, 
the defendant's attorneys and the defendant are and will be 
permitted to present evidence and arguments for or against 
the sentence of death. 
In reaching your verdict you may consider all of the 
facts and circumstances, if you find there be any, in mitigation 
of punishment. In determining whether aggravating or mitigating 
circumstances exist you may consider all of the evidence produced 
either by the State or the defendant throughout the guilt 
phase or penalty phase of the trial. 
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Mitigating circumstances may include circumstances which 
do not constitute justification or excuse for the crime but 
which may be _ considered as extenuating or reducing the moral 
culpability.or blame. 
Reasonable doubt in the penalty phase means a doubt that 
is based on reason and one which is reasonable in view of 
all of the evidence. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is that 
degree of proof which satisfies the mind and convinces the 
understanding of those who are bound to act conscientiously 
upon it. Reasonable doubt is a doubt which reasonable men 
and women would entertain, and it must arise from the evidence 
or lack of evidence in the case. 
If after an impartial consideration and comparison of 
all of the evidence in the case you can candidly say that 
you are not satisified that the death penalty should be imposed, 
you have a reasonable doubt. But if after such impartial 
consideration and comparison of all the evidence you can truth-
fully say that you have an abiding conviction that the death 
penalty is appropriate such as you would be willing to act 
upon in the more weighty and important matters relating to 
your own affairs, you have no reasonable doubt. A reasonable 
doubt must be a real, substantial doubt and not one that is 
»erely possible^or imaginary. 
The burden of proof necessary for a verdict of death 
over life imprisonment in this case is on the State and after 
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considering the totality of the aggravating and mitigating 
circumstances, not in terms of the relative numbers of the 
aggravating and mitigating factors, but in terms of their 
respective substantiveness and persuasiveness, you must be 
persuaded beyond a reasonable doubt that total aggravation 
outweighs total mitigation, and you must further be persuaded, 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the imposition of the death 
penalty is justified and appropriate in this case. 
The jury is instructed that it can consider as aggravating 
circumstances the very matters which were aggravating circumstances 
in the guilt phase. Said aggravating circumstances upon which 
you were instructed in the guilt phase were as follows: 
1. The defendant, Ronnie Lee Gardner, knowingly created 
a risk of death to a person other than the victim, Michael 
Joseph Burdell, and the defendant, Ronnie Lee Gardner. 
2. The homicide was committed for the purpose of effecting 
the escape of the defendant, Ronnie Lee Gardner, from lawful 
custody. 
3. The defendant, Ronnie Lee Gardner, was previously 
convicted of a felony involving the use or threat of violence 
to a person, to-wit: Robbery on February 22, 1980, and/or 
Robbery on September 17, 1981. 
You may consider as aggravating circumstances the nature 
and circumstances of the crime and any other facts in aggravation 
produced that relate to the nature and circumstances of the 
crime or the individual character of the defendant• 
With respect to mitigating circumstances, the law provides 
that you may consider the following: 
1. The murder was committed while the defendant was 
under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance; 
2. At the time of the murder the capacity of the defendant 
to appreciate the criminality (wrongfulness) of his conduct 
or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was substantially 
impaired as a result of mental disease. 
3. The youth of the defendant at the time of the crime. 
4. Any other fact in mitigation of the penalty. 
The above circumstances are not stated as facts proved 
in this case, however, any of these circumstances which you 
find have been established by the evidence shall be considered 
by you as mitigating circumstances to be balanced against 
the aggravating circumstances. 
However, the mitigating circumstances which I have read 
for your consideration are given to you merely as examples 
of some of the factors that you may take into account as reasons 
for deciding not to impose a death sentence upon Mr. Gardner. 
You should pay careful attention to each of those facts. 
Any one of them may be sufficient, standing alone, if the 
State fails to show beyond a reasonable doubt that the aggrava-
ting circumstances outweigh mitigating circumstances and to 
support a decision that death is not the appropriate punish-
ment in this case. But you should not limit your consideration 
of mitigating circumstances to these specific factors. You 
may also consider any other circumstances (relating to the 
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case or to the defendant, Mr. Gardner), as reasons for not 
imposing the death sentence. 
You are instructed that in the penalty phase, sympathy 
and sentiment may be considered by you in arriving at your 
verdict. 
It would be a violation of a duty as jurors if you were 
to fix the penalty at death because of a doubt that the Utah 
State Board of Pardons will properly carry out its responsi-
bilities. 
The law further provides that if you return a unanimous 
verdict of death, then that sentence will be imposed by the 
Court. On the other hand, if you do not reach a unanimous 
verdict of death, then the Court is required to impose a sen-
tence of life imprisonment. Thus, if any one or more of you 
do not vote for the sentence of death, a life sentence shall 
be imposed in this case. 
The State of Utah and the defendant may now proceed to 
bring before you such aggravating and mitigating circumstances 
as may be relevant to the sentence to be imposed, and at the 
conclusion of the proceedings you will retire for deliberation 
thereon. When in the course of your deliberations you either 
reach a unanimous verdict of death, or you become reasonably 
satisfied that such unanimous verdict will not be rendered, 
you will notify the bailiff that you are ready to report to 
the court. 
-*- rtnr\r 
Your verdicts must be eithert 
We the jury impaneled in the above case having heretofore 
found the defendant guilty of Ciminal Homicide, Murder in 
the First Degree, Count I of the Information, unanimously 
render a verdict of death; or 
We the jury impaneled in the above case. Count I of the 
Information find that our deliberations have been concluded 
and we are reasonably satisfied that we will not reach a unanimous 
verdict of death. 
The foreman will sign the appropriate verdict, and not 
the other, and bring both verdict forms back into Court. 
Dated at Salt Lake City, Utah &&2H; tiff 
y JUDGE 
*:,,•. ATTEST 
?•'• H D'.XON HINDLEY 
t 




OR NOT SOCIETY OUGHT TO RETAIN THE DEATH PENALTY OR DO AWAY 
WITH THE DEATH PENALTY. WHAT WOULD BE YOUR VOTE AT THIS 
TIME? 
MR. ENNISS: I AM STRONGLY IRISH. I AM 
STRONGLY OPINIONATED, BUT IN LIGHT OF THAT AND MY SOCIETAL 
SUPPORT I HAVE EXPRESSED EARLIER, I WOULD VOTE FOR THE 
DEATH PENALTY. 
MR. ANDREW VALDEZ: THANK YOU. 
THE COURT: THAT IS ALL. YOU ARE EXCUSED UNTIL 
TEN O'CLOCK TOMORROW MORNING. DON'T DISCUSS THE CASE WITH 
ANYONE. DON'T READ OR VIEW ANYTHING ABOUT THIS CASE IN THE 
MEANTIME. 
ANY CHALLENGE? OKAY. LET'S TAKE A RECESS. 
(RECESS TAKEN.) 
THE COURT: WHOSE FUNERAL WERE YOU GOING TO, 
FAMILY MEMBER OR NOT? 
MR. COP1NGA: IT IS MORE OR LESS OF AN ADOPTED 
MOTHER, FLOS1E NIELSON. SHE LIVES IN ELMO, UTAH. 
THE COURT: OKAY. THAT'S ENOUGH. WE WILL 
QUESTION YOU NOW SO YOU CAN BE EXCUSED. IF YOU ARE ALLOWED 
TO GO TO THE FUNERAL, WHAT TIME WOULD YOU BE BACK? 
MR. COP1NGA: THE FUNERAL IS AT ELEVEN O'CLOCK 
TOMORROW. 1 WOULD HAVE TO LEAVE SALT LAKE BY EIGHT O'CLOCK 
TO BE THERE BY ELEVEN. I IMAGINE IT WOULD TAKE AN HOUR, 
HOUR 15 MINUTES. THAT WOULD PUT ME BACK IN SALT LAKE AT 
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WHEREABOUTS IS IT? 
ELMO, UTAH. 
IT WOULDN'T TAKE YOU THAT LONG. 
TAKES ABOUT TWO AND A HALF HOURS 
HAVE YOU HEARD ANYTHING OR READ 












N O . J 
PRIOR TO THAT TIME, CAN YOU TELL US 
OR HEARING ABOUT THE CASE? 1 
JUST THE INCIDENT AS IT OCCURRED 







A WOMAN HANDING A MAN A GUN AND THE 
ATTORNEY AND BEING SHOT. I REMEMBER SEEING 
ON TV OF THE SHOT VICTIM SITTING ON THE GRASS. 
THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. CAN YOU TELL ME WHAT 






COPINGA: AS FAR AS AN ATTITUDE, I DON'T 
COMMITMENT ONE WAY OR THE OTHER. 
COURT: 
FACT SITUATION, 






UNDER SOME CIRCUMSTANCES, DEPENDING 
, COULD YOU SEE THE DEATH PENALTY TO 
YES. 
AND IF YOU FOUND IT TO BE 
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APPROPRIATE, COULD YOU SEE YOURSELF VOTING FOR A DEATH 
PENALTY? 
MR. COPINGA: YES. 
THE COURT: AND UNDER OTHER CIRCUMSTANCES, 
DEPENDING UPON THE FACT SITUATION IN A DEATH CASE, COULD 
YOU SEE YOURSELF IMPOSING LIFE IMPRISONMENT RATHER THAN 
DEATH? 
MR. COPINGA: NO. 
THE COURT: YOU CAN'T SEE YOURSELF? 
MR. COPINGA: NO. 
THE COURT: NOW, I INDICATED TO YOU THAT THERE 
IS A GUILT PHASE AND A PENALTY PHASE. THE FIRST PHASE IS 
MERELY TO DETERMINE THE GUILT OR INNOCENCE. IN THE PENALTY 
PHASE YOU WOULD BE INSTRUCTED THAT TAKING ALL OF THE 
EVIDENCE, BOTH THE GUILT PHASE AND THE PENALTY PHASE, INTO 
CONSIDERATION, THAT YOU WOULD HAVE TO FIND BEYOND A 
REASONABLE DOUBT THAT THE AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES OUTWEIGH' 
THE MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES. 
FURTHER, YOU WOULD HAVE TO FIND THAT BEYOND A 
REASONABLE DOUBT THAT THE DEATH PENALTY WAS THE ONLY 
APPROPRIATE PENALTY IN THIS CASE BEFORE YOU COULD VOTE FOR 
SUCH A PENALTY. IF YOU DIDN'T FIND THOSE TO BE, TO EXIST, 
THAT THE AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES OUTWEIGHED THE MITIGATING 
CIRCUMSTANCES BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT, AND FURTHER, THAT 
IT IS THE ONLY APPROPRIATE PENALTY IN THIS CASE, COULD YOU 
~/i 
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COME BACK WITH A LIFE SENTENCE? 
MR. COP1NGA: IF THAT'S THE ONLY VERDICT. 
THE COURT: WELL, THERE IS TWO, BUT YOU ARE THE 
ONE THAT HAS TO DETERMINE THE FACT SITUATION ONE WAY OR THE 
OTHER. 
MR. COPINGA: IF THE FACTS POINT TOWARDS THAT, 
YES, 1 COULD. 
THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. YOU MAY QUESTION. 
MR. STOTT: SIR, I BELIEVE YOU SAID YOUR 
FEELINGS WEREN'T STRONG ONE WAY OR THE OTHER. IN YOUR OWN 
MIND, WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF THE DEATH PENALTY? WHAT DOES 
IT ACCOMPLISH? 
MR. COPINGA: I GUESS JUST A — A LAW THAT 
STIPULATES THAT THAT IS THE PAYMENT FOR THE CRIME THAT YOU 
COMMITTED. 
MR. STOTT: IF YOU WERE ON THE LEGISLATURE AND 
YOU HAD TO VOTE TO KEEP THE DEATH PENALTY OR NOT TO KEEP 
THE DEATH PENALTY, WHICH WAY DO YOU THINK YOU WOULD VOTE? 
MR. COPINGA: I WOULD VOTE TO KEEP THE DEATH 
PENALTY. 
MR. STOTT: SOMETIMES IT IS KIND OF EASY TO 
TALK ABOUT IT IN THE ABSTRACT, BUT IF YOU GOT THE SITUATION 
WHERE YOU ARE ON THAT JURY AND IT CAME DOWN TO YOUR VOTE TO 
MAKE A DECISION ONE WAY OR THE OTHER WHETHER HE LIVED OR 
DIED AND IT WAS LEFT RIGHT UP TO YOU, DO YOU THINK YOU COULDj 
. r.03 
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MAKE A DECISION EITHER WAY? 
MR. COPINGA: YES. 
MR. STOTT: OR DO YOU THINK YOU WOULD KIND OF 
THROW UP YOUR HANDS AND SAY, "NO, NOT ME." 
MR. COPINGA: I THINK I HAVE MADE THAT 
COMMITMENT IN THE COURTROOM BEFORE. 
MR. STOTT: AND IF YOU FELT THAT THE EVIDENCE 
SHOWED AND THE LAW WAS MET THAT DEATH WAS APPROPRIATE, YOU 
COULD VOTE FOR THE DEATH PENALTY? 
MR. COPINGA: YES. 
MR. STOTT: EVEN IF 11 OTHER JURORS WANTED LIFE? 
MR. COPINGA: YES. 
MR. STOTT: THANK YOU. THAT IS ALL THE 
QUESTIONS 1 HAVE. 
MR. ANDREW VALDEZ: MR. COPINGA, IF THE FACT 
SITUATION LED TO WHERE YOU COULD CONSIDER EITHER THE DEATH 
PENALTY OR LIFE, WHICH WOULD YOU GO FOR? WHICH WOULD YOU 
LEAN TOWARDS? 
MR. COPINGA: I WOULD HAVE TO — IT WOULD 
STRICTLY BE ACCORDING TO THE EVIDENCE PROVIDED. RIGHT NOW 
1 COULDN'T SAY. 
MR. ANDREW VALDEZ: NOW, DO YOU CONSIDER LIFE 
IN PRISON A SEVERE PUNISHMENT? 
MR. COPINGA: YES, I DO. 
MR. ANDREW VALDEZ: UNDER WHAT SITUATIONS DO YOU 
_r\ 
2UZ 
THINK THE DEATH PENALTY WOULD BE WARRANTED? 
MR. COPINGA: I THINK THE LAW STIPULATES THAT. 
I THINK MURDER. 
MR. ANDREW VALDEZ: SO IF, IN FACT, ONE TAKES A 
LIFE, HE SHOULD PAY WITH FORFEITURE OF HIS OWN LIFE. IS 
THAT YOUR POSITION? 
MR. COPINGA: YES, IF IT IS THAT CLEAR-CUT. 
MR. ANDREW VALDEZ: SO IF MR. GARDNER WAS 
CONVICTED OF MURDER, WHAT YOU ARE SAYING IS IT IS CLEAR-CUT 
THAT YOU WOULD VOTE FOR THE DEATH PENALTY? 
MR. COPINGA: IF ALL THE EVIDENCE POINTS TOWARD 
THAT, YES. 
MR. ANDREW VALDEZ: IF, IN FACT, HE WAS 
CONVICTED OF FIRST-DEGREE MURDER AND YOU FOUND HIM GUILTY, 
AS A JUROR, AND YOU WENT TO THE PENALTY PHASE, THE 
PROSECUTION WOULD PRESENT EVIDENCE THAT WOULD SHOW THE BAD 
AND WE WOULD PRESENT EVIDENCE THAT WOULD SHOW THE GOOD; THE 
AGGRAVATION VERSUS THE MITIGATION. 
THE JUDGE INSTRUCTED YOU THAT IN ORDER TO 
IMPOSE THE DEATH PENALTY THE AGGRAVATION HAD TO OUTWEIGH 
THE MITIGATION BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT. 
COULD YOU CONSIDER A LESS SEVERE PENALTY SUCH 
AS LIFE? 
MR. COPINGA: I DON'T KNOW. 
MR. JAMES VALDEZ: ARE YOU SAYING THAT UNLESS 
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THE DEFENDANT SHOWS YOU SUFFICIENT MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES 
OR SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE, THAT MORE THAN LIKELY YOU WOULD 
VOTE FOR THE DEATH PENALTY? 
MR. COPINGA: YES. 
MR. ANDREW VALDEZ: WOULD THE BURDEN BE 
INCUMBENT UPON MR. GARNDER TO PRESENT THAT EVIDENCE? 
MR. COPINGA: I THINK IT WOULD DEPEND ON THE 
EVIDENCE PROVIDED BY BOTH THE STATE AND BY MR. GARDNER. 
MR. ANDREW VALDEZ: HAVE YOU FORMED AN OPINION 
AS TO MR. GARDNER'S GUILT OR INNOCENCE IN THIS MATTER? 
MR. COPINGA: NO, I HAVE NOT. 
MR. JAMES VALDEZ: SO, THEN, YOU WOULD REQUIRE 
MR. GARNDER TO SHOW EVIDENCE AS TO WHY THE DEATH PENALTY 
SHOULD NOT BE IMPOSED THEN; IS THAT CORRECT? 
MR. COPINGA: I GUESS WHAT I WOULD LIKE TO SAY 
HERE, I WOULD HAVE TO SEE IF HE WAS INNOCENT OF THE CRIME 
BEFORE I COULD DETERMINE WHAT PENALTY. 
MR. JAMES VALDEZ: SO, IN OTHER WORDS, IF HE 
WERE FOUND TO BE COMPLETELY INNOCENT OF THE CRIME, YOU WOULDJ 
NOT IMPOSE THE DEATH PENALTY OR YOU WOULD NOT FEEL THE DEATH] 
PENALTY WAS APPROPRIATE? 
MR. COPINGA: IF HE WAS INNOCENT OF THE CRIME, 
THE DEATH PENALTY WOULDN'T BE NEEDED. 
THE COURT: WOULD YOU FOLLOW THE COURT'S 
INSTRUCTIONS AS TO THE LAW OF THIS CASE? 
«cV> 
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MR. COPINGA: YES, I WOULD. 
MR. STOTT: COULD I ASK A QUESTION, YOUR HONOR? 
MR. COPINGA, SAY THAT YOU WERE ON THE JURY AND 
THE JURY FOUND HIM GUILTY OF FIRST-DEGREE MURDER AND THE 
COURT TOLD YOU THAT THE PENALTY WAS NOT AUTOMATICALLY DEATH 
OR LIFE, BUT YOU HAD TO HAVE ANOTHER HEARING, AND THEN IN 
THAT OTHER HEARING YOU COULD ONLY IMPOSE THE DEATH PENALTY 
WITH CERTAIN REQUIREMENTS ON THAT, EVEN IF HE IS FOUND 
GUILTY. 
IN THAT PENALTY PHASE, IF YOU FOUND THOSE 
REQUIREMENTS WERE NOT MET, COULD YOU THEN VOTE FOR LIFE? 
MR. COPINGA: IF IT WAS THAT CLEAR-CUT, I DON'T 
THINK THERE WOULD BE ANY PROBLEM. 
MR. ANDREW VALDEZ: MR. COPINGA, HAVE YOU EVER 
EXPRESSED AN OPINION THAT ANY PERSON THAT CAUSES THE DEATH 
OF ANOTHER SHOULD SUFFER THE DEATH PENALTY? 
MR. COPINGA: I PROBABLY HAVE, YES. I AM SURE 
THERE ARE CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH WOULD ALTER THAT. 
MR. JAMES VALDEZ: WHAT SORT OF CIRCUMSTANCES 
WOULD THAT BE? 
MR. COPINGA: I GUESS IT WOULD -- I AM NOT RIGHT 
SURE. 1 THINK THAT PEOPLE SOMETIMES DO A LOT OF THINGS SPURj 
OF THE MOMENT WHERE IF THEY COUNT TO TEN, THEY PROBABLY 




MR. JAMES VALDEZ: SO, THEN, IF SOMEBODY WAS 
KILLED IN THE SPUR OF THE MOMENT, WOULD THAT BE A 
CIRCUMSTANCE THAT YOU WOULD CONSIDER NOT IMPOSING THE DEATH 
PENALTY? 
MR. COPINGA: I DO^T KNOW. I REALLY DON'T 
KNOW. 
MR. ANDREW VALDEZ: WHEN YOU FIRST HEARD ABOUT 
THIS INCIDENT, WHAT WAS YOUR REACTION TO THE INFORMATION 
THAT YOU RECEIVED? IS THAT WHEN YOU EXPRESSED THAT OPINION?] 
MR. COPINGA: NO. 
MR. ANDREW VALDEZ: WHAT WAS YOUR REACTION? 
MR. COPINGA: I DON'T THINK I HAD A REACTION ONE 
WAY OR THE OTHER. 
MR. ANDREW VALDEZ: ONE MORE QUESTION. YOU 
INDICATED TO THE COURT THAT YOU KNEW MR. DANSIE. 
MR. COPINGA: YES. 
MR. ANDREW VALDEZ: IN WHAT CAPACITY DO YOU 
KNOW MR. DANSIE? 
MR. COPINGA: WHEN I WAS SINGLE, I LIVED IN THE 
AIX LA CHAPELLE APARTMENTS OUT IN HOLLADAY, AND HE LIVED IN 
THE AIX LE CHAPELLE APARTMENTS, ALSO. I WOULD SEE HIM AT 
CHURCH ON SUNDAYS, AND WE HAD SOME ACQUAINTANCES. BUT 
OTHER THAN THAT, IT WAS JUST — 
MR. ANDREW VALDEZ: HOW LONG AGO WAS THAT? 




MR. ANDREW VALDEZ: WOULD YOU FEEL UNCOMFORTABLE] 
BEING ON THE SAME JURY — IF YOU WERE CHOSEN ON THE JURY — 
WOULD YOU FEEL UNCOMFORTABLE BEING ON THE SAME JURY PANEL 
AS MR. DANSIE? 
MR. COPINGA: NO, I HAVE NO PROBLEM WITH THAT. 
WE WERE NEVER THAT WELL ACQUAINTED. WE WOULD SAY, "HI," 
BUT THAT'S THE TOTAL EXTENT OF IT. 
MR. ANDREW VALDEZ: OKAY. THANK YOU. 
MR. JAMES VALDEZ: DO YOU FEEL THAT THE DEATH 
PENALTY IS APPROPRIATE, AN APPROPRIATE ALTERNATIVE IN ANY 
HOMICIDE, AN APPROPRIATE ALTERNATIVE AS A SENTENCING 
ALTERNATIVE? 
MR. COPINGA: IN ANY HOMICIDE? 
MR. JAMES VALDEZ: YES. 
MR. COPINGA: GEE, I WISH IT WAS THAT EASY AND 
THAT CLEAR-CUT. WE PROBABLY WOULDN'T HAVE HALF OF THE 
PROBLEMS WE DO. 1 DON'T THINK ANYTHING IS THAT CLEAR-CUT. 
MR. JAMES VALDEZ: WHAT ARE YOUR PERSONAL 
OPINIONS? 
MR. COPINGA: I THINK IF SOMEBODY JUST GOES OUT 
AND KILLS HALF A DOZEN PEOPLE, I DON'T THINK THERE IS ANY 
QUESTION. 
MR. JAMES VALDEZ: IN WHAT SORT OF CASE WOULD 
THERE BE A QUESTION IN YOUR MIND? 
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MR. COPINGA: 1 THINK SOME PEOPLE CAN BE DRIVEN 
TO IT, MAYBE THEY ARE MENTALLY INCAPABLE, A LOT OF THINGS. 
MR. JAMES VALDEZ: AND IN THOSE TYPE OF 
SITUATIONS YOU WOULD RATHER IMPOSE A LIFE SENTENCE? 
MR. COPINGA: YOU KNOW, 1 DON'T KNOW. 1 DON'T 
KNOW WHICH WOULD BE WORSE. IF I, MYSELF, WERE PUT IN THAT 
PREDICAMENT AND I HAVE A CHOICE OF LIFE IMPRISONMENT OR 
DEATH, 1 KNOW WHICH ONE I WOULD PICK. THERE WOULD BE NO 
HESITATION. 
MR. ANDREW VALDEZ: WHICH ONE WOULD YOU PICK? 
MR. COPINGA: I WOULD PICK DEATH BECAUSE I 
COULD NOT STAND TO BE CONFINED. THAT WOULD BE WORSE THAN 
ANYTHING ELSE. TWO HOURS IN THIS COURTROOM AND THIS AND MY 
BUTT IS SO SORE I WANT TO MOVE. THAT WOULD BE MUCH WORSE, 
BEING CONFINED WOULD BE MUCH WORSE THAN DEATH. 
MR. ANDREW VALDEZ: DO YOU THINK THAT WOULD 
HOLD TRUE FOR EVERYBODY? 
MR. COPINGA: NO, I AM SURE IT WOULDN'T BE. 
MR. JAMES VALDEZ: MR. STOTT ASKED YOU IF THERE 
WERE 11 PEOPLE AND YOURSELF WAS THE DECIDING VOTE, WHETHER 
OR NOT YOU WOULD HAVE THE COURAGE TO VOTE FOR DEATH, AND I 
THINK YOU INDICATED THAT YOU WOULD. 
MR. COPINGA: 1 HAVE NEVER BEEN MUCH OF A 
FOLLOWER. I PRETTY WELL DO *HAT 1 WANT. 
MR. JAMES VALDEZ: SUPPOSING THERE WERE 11 
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I WANT. I 
MR. 
THE 









COPINGA: I PRETTY WELL SAY 
AM NOT CHANGED THAT EASILY, 
ANDREW VALDEZ: THANK YOU. 
COURT: ALL RIGHT. YOU GET 
. IS THERE ANYPLACE WE CAN 
COPINGA: YES, THERE IS. I 







COURT: LEAVE IT WITH MY BAILIFF 
COPINGA: ALL RIGHT. I WILL DO 









OF THE NEWSCASTS 
1 OR TV OR DISCUSS IT WITH ANYONE. SOMEONE MIGHT 
YOU, JUST TELL THEM YOU CAN'T DISCUSS THE CASE. 
MR. ANDREW VALDEZ: JUDGE, AS FAR AS 










COURT: ALL RIGHT. 
. HANSEN, HAVE YOU HEARD OR 1 
IN THE LAST FIVE DAYS? 
GUY 
READ 




HANSEN: NOT WITHIN THE LAST FIVE DAYS, 
COURT: PRIOR TO THAT TIME, 
YOU REMEMBER HEARING ABOUT THE CASE? 
CAN YOU TELL 
NO. 
US 
. * -J& 
